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China's Natural Forest Protection Plan of 1998 is a ten-year policy attempting to reduce 
the severity and frequency of devastating floods in the nation's major watersheds. The 
purpose of this paper is to analyze NFPP implementation and to determine its 
effectiveness in producing the desired outputs. A modified version of Sabatier and 
Mazmanian's (1980) framework for analyzing policy implementation is used to conduct 
the analysis. Several factors contribute to the determination of NFPP implementation as 
ineffective particularly the inclusion of extraneous socio-economic development goals, a 
low level of institutional capacity, and restrictions over forest related activities for non-
state forest enterprises. Although the State Forest Administration is the intended target-
group of the policy and the policy appears initially successful in curtailing industrial 
logging on State lands, the extension of restrictions to non-state forest enterprises 
contradicts previously guaranteed usufruct rights and negatively effects NFPP 
implementation. Several recommendations are made for improving the effectiveness of 
NFPP implementation including removing the socio-economic development goals, 
improving SFA capacity at all levels, and stabilizing usufruct rights. Stabilizing the 
policy atmosphere includes reducing or eliminating State control over non-state forest 
enterprises, providing compensation to those who are restricted from operating due to the 
NFPP and supporting the legally established rights of usufruct through judicial regress. 
This analysis reveals some of the shortcomings of NFPP implementation and the 
applicability of a modified Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) framework for analyzing 
forest policy implementation in China and organizes a broad range of sources considering 
NFPP implementation, its effectiveness and its extensive impacts. 
Abstract: 
Advisor: Jim Burchfield 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
China's forest industry was forever changed by the establishment of the Natural 
Forest Protection Plan (NFPP) of 1998. The sweeping policy seeks to reduce the 
frequency, severity and impact of floods in the nation's major watersheds through the 
achievement of several ambitious goals. The "logging ban," as the NFPP is often 
referred to as, not only attempts to eliminate industrial timber harvesting on all State 
lands in 18 out of 26 provinces and autonomous regions, but it further endeavors to 
permanently reestablish and increase vegetative cover throughout the target areas in an 
effort to mitigate disastrous flooding. Several other goals are integrated into the policy 
including diversifying the rural economy, restructuring the State agency responsible for 
managing the nation's forestlands, and meeting domestic wood demands, among other 
goals. Such dramatic transformations are becoming increasingly more commonplace in 
contemporary China, and often with mixed results. 
China is changing rapidly. The very core of its political system has been 
irrevocably altered from the former autocratic State model under Mao Zedong to what is 
known as the reformist paradigm initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970's 
(Richardson, 1990). Reform era policies have generally assumed two forms over the last 
25 years. Reducing the level and pervasiveness of government control over financial 
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market systems is the first aspect of China's reform era policies. The decentralization of 
decision-making authority from the central government level to progressively lower 
levels of existing political hierarchies is the second fundamental reform occurring in 
China's political system (Richardson, 1990). This devolution of decision-making power 
is not only characterized by the privatization of formally State-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
but is also extended to rights of usufruct and tenure over land for non-state commercial 
enterprises (Richardson, 1990).^ 
China's forestry sector, together with the many other industrial sectors in China, 
has been deeply impacted by reform era policies—especially those pertaining to control 
over land. Numerous policy changes directed at both State and non-state enterprises 
engaged in the management of forest resources in China have occurred over the last two 
decades (Hyde et al., 2003). However, due to the inherent nature of communism, the 
transfer of control over land away from the State has always been a contentious issue in 
China. Consequently, internal struggles among conservative and reformist factions of the 
State bureaucracy and inconsistencies in policy reforms have plagued China's efforts to 
decentralize control over forest resources (Richardson, 1990; Yamane, 2001). This 
ideological battle has resulted in what may be termed as a "two steps forward, one step 
back" policy progression. Such an atmosphere has resulted in uncertainty among those 
' Throughout this text the term 'central' may be considered synonymous with the 
American usage of 'federal' while the term 'State' simply refers to government 
jurisdiction or agencies as opposed to non-govemmental establishments. Additionally, 
State agencies in China are organized in a descending hierarchy with the central (federal) 
government at the top followed by provincial (synonymous with American states), 
prefectural (similar to American congressional districts), county and township/local level 
agency administrations. See Figure 5, page 28. 
^See Appendix 1, Table A "Major Forest Policies of the Reform Era." 
2 
who are engaged in forestry businesses and activities. Liu (2001) notes that a definite 
relationship exists between tenure security, or certainty, and the sustainable management 
of forest resources and forest cover. He further notes that the underlying cause of forest 
degradation in the nation may be directly attributed to the lack of confidence in property 
rights caused by fi-equent policy changes in China's forestry sector over the last half 
century. 
In 1998 the Ministry of Forestry was downgraded from an economic ministry 
functioning below the planning and economic commissions to the State Forest 
Administration. 
The Ministry of Forestry was broken into three components: the 
part that manages nature reserves and national parks was moved to the 
State environmental protection agency; the part that manages most major 
afforestation, reforestation and new shelterbelt activities was moved 
directly under the State Council [and renamed the State Forest 
Administration]; and the remainder of the ministry and its logging and 
manufacturing enterprises are being commercialized (Rozelle et al., 2003, 
pl32nl). 
The restructuring attempts to reform the utilitarian minded, extraction-based 
Ministry of Forestry (MOF) into a State Forest Administration (SFA) charged with 
stewardship responsibilities of forest protection and reforestation. The Natural Forest 
Protection Plan of 1998 is one of the most significant reforms to have occurred in China's 
forestry sector. The policy further extends the frmdamental restructiuing of the SFA, 
which was initiated earlier in the same year (1998), and the restructuring of China's 
forest industry, both State and non-state, primarily through a ban on industrial timber 
harvesting and logging in all but a few provinces. 
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The central government blamed dramatic reductions in forest cover within the 
nation's major watersheds for a series of devastating floods occurring in the summer of 
1998. Over 2,500 people perished and an estimated $20 billion USD in damages were 
inflicted in the southwestern provinces of Sichuan and Yunnan (Zhang et al., 2000). 
These floods opened a policy "window of opportunity" securing the needed political 
support to take necessary action. "The [NFPP] policy was launched in 1998 in order to 
accelerate the improvement of the ecological environment in degraded natural forests 
and, at the same time, to realize biodiversity conservation and sustainable development 
for social and economic welfare" (Lu, 2000 in Yamane, 2001, p5). 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze implementation of the Natural Forest 
Protection Plan in China's southwestern forest management region and to assess the 
effectiveness of the policy at achieving the desired outcomes thus far. This is 
accomplished by utilizing a modified version of Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) 
conceptual framework for analyzing the implementation process, which was chosen due 
to its concise, comprehensive organization and flexibility making it applicable in a 
variety of (non-western) contexts. The fi-amework is modified in order to accommodate 
China's unique cultural setting and the complicated forest management context existing in 
the nation's southwestern forest management region. Although the Sabatier and 
Mazmanian (1980) framework is intended to be utilized as an analytic tool that reviews a 
given policy's implementation from start to finish, the modified Sabatier and Mazmanian 
(1980) framework is applied in order to determine effectiveness of implementation 
halfway through the NFPP's lifespan. 
^ See page viii for a general map of China. 
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Land tenure (security) plays a pivotal role in the management of forest resources 
given the context (Richardson, 1990; Yamane, 2001; Liu, 2001). A strong understanding 
of this factor must therefore be developed together with a historical description of how 
existing forest management systems in southeast China evolved. This understanding is 
developed through an analysis of the Natural Forest Protection Plan and the nature of its 
implementation that considers the following questions: 
• What is the Natural Forest Protection Plan? 
• What are its purpose and goals? 
• How and why did it evolve? 
• How is it being implemented? 
• What are the policy outcomes? 
• How successful has implementation of the NFPP been in attaining the desired 
outcomes and what factors have limited the effectiveness of the policy? 
Some key elements of the policy implementation process examined in order to 
address the above questions include statutory and non-statutory variables as well as the 
tractability of the problem. Consideration of these elements includes examining the 
rationale for the policy, the feasibility to affect change within the given context, the 
specificity or clarity of policy statutes, practical (human, material and financial) support 
for the policy, as well as existing socio-economic and environmental conditions within 
the study area. In addition, the dependent variables of compliance, actual and perceived 
impacts, and achievement in meeting the established goals, which are inextricably linked 
to the existent policy outcomes, are examined in order to better understand those 
outcomes and the effectiveness of policy implementation. 
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It is important to vmderstand the inter-relationship between independent variables 
and policy outcomes of the NFPP for several reasons. Hundreds of millions of people are 
potentially impacted by the NFPP and the nature of its implementation with millions 
more directly affected (Chinatoday, 2005). Many of these stakeholders include at least 
18 of China's ethnic minorities who are struggling to maintain their traditional ways of 
life. Socio-economic conditions in southwest China, especially in the movintain-forest 
communities where the NFPP has the most noticeable impact, are often basic, to say the 
least. Quality of education in the region is behind the rest of the nation, employment 
opportunities are extremely limited and the per capita income is among the lowest in the 
world (Jintao et al., 2002). For these reasons, and due to the fact that the goal of the 
NFPP is to alter a primary rural industry thereby necessarily affecting existing socio­
economic conditions, it is essential to understand the policy's outcomes and the nature of 
implementation. 
Also threatened by the way in which the NFPP is implemented are the last 
remains of the world's most biologically diverse temperate forests. With more than 50 
conifer species, 80 types of forest formations and as many as 250 endangered floral and 
faunal species—^most of which are endemic, the moimtain forests of southwestern China 
are a priceless storehouse of biological diversity (lUCN, 2005). Inasmuch as the NFPP is 
a forest policy being applied in this imique and sensitive ecosystem, it is important to 
understand what outcomes the policy is having on the natural environment. 
Policy outcomes depend, in large part, on the process by which a policy is 
implemented within a given context. For this reason, and due to the conditions cited 
above, the paper is a retrospective analysis using Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) 
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framework for analyzing the implementation of China's 1998 Natural Forest Protection 
Plan. It is hoped that the analysis will provide a better understanding of the policy's 
shortcomings so that a more effective policy may be developed once the NFPP is phased 
out or abandoned. Furthermore, this activity may prove useful for a number of different 
audiences, not the least of whom may include the fledgling State Forest Administration of 
China as well as several elements of the State government at central, provincial and other 
lower level decision-makers. The information contained in this paper and the findings of 
the analysis, inasmuch as it represents a sjoithesis of a diversity of sources concerned 
with NFPP implementation and its impacts, may also prove insightful and useful to non-
state managers of forests in China as well as several NGO's operating in the region arid 
who are concerned with the socio-economic and environmental situation there. 
A brief backgrovmd section and literature review provides the necessary 
information for fi-aming the context of the inquiry. Following the literature review in 
chapter three, the methods to be utilized for conducting the analysis are explicated in 
chapter four. Once this is accomplished, an assessment of how and why the policy 
evolved and an identification of its goals and purposes are provided. Subsequently, in 
chapter five the conceptual fi-amework for analyzing the implementation process, as 
defined by Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), is applied in an effort to critically examine 
the NFPP's implementation. One would like to think that there is some significant reason 
for implementing a policy as pervasive as the NFPP—and indeed there is. However, 
since no long-term forest management plan currently exists, reflection on alternative 
approaches to forest management in the region after the NFPP's implementation merits 
consideration. The contribution of this work lies in the providing an analysis of 
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implementation that can inform future forest policy changes that can more effectively 
achieve realistic policy goals. 
Chapter 2 
BACKGROUND 
China—^the name alone conjures as many different thoughts and images as there 
are people in the vast and ancient nation. Throughout its long history, China has often 
struggled to strike a balance between development and the use of its natural resources 
(Harkness, 1998; Li, 2000). The emphasis of this chapter rests on how social, political 
and economic conditions have shaped the forests existing in southwestern China today. 
The focus is on the interaction between government policies and land tenure—^the two 
most dominant forces altering the remaining forests and molding the State and non-state 
entities managing them. Once an understanding of these key factors is established, a 
meaningful analysis of NFPP implementation may be conducted. 
The Commune Era: 
The Chinese communist revolution was fought not only because of the general 
state of unrest pervasive during the 1930's and 1940's, but it was also in reaction to the 
overbearing landlord system that capitalized large tracts of land benefiting the elite few 
(Elvin, 1998). Without any means to subsist or survive, and due to an evolving serfdom 
system, the common masses felt that there was no other choice but to revolt. Mao 
Zedong's Peoples Liberation Army defeated the Nationalist Army establishing the 
People's Republic of China in 1949. All land (private, commercial and non-
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secular/religious) was nationalized soon thereafter (Liu, 2003). Communities, 
households and individuals were reorganized into communes in an effort to maintain 
agricultural and economic productivity. The communal tenure system remained 
dominate through the 1970's. 
Table 1: Trends in Tenure Management of Non-state Forests in China since 1950. 
Time Period Major Features and Events 
1950-1955 
• Integration of use-rights to land and land ownership. 
• Private ownership of forests was the single, dominate form of ownership 
except in border and ethnic areas. 
• Integration of tree ownership and land ownership. 
• 1950-1952: Land Reform Campaign distributed equally land, forest, 
and other means of production to farmer households. 
• 1953-1955; Agricultural production organized at three levels: household, 
mutual aid team and elementary cooperative. 
1956-1980 
• Collective ownership was single, dominant form of ownership. 
• Integration of use rights to land and land ownership. 
• Informal split in tree ownership and land ownership. 
• 1956; 96% of rural households incorporated into advanced cooperatives; 
land, forests and other means of production transferred to advanced 
cooperatives from individual households. 
• 1958; forests fiirther transferred from advanced cooperatives to peoples 
communes. 
• 1961 -1964: adjustment of Chinese economy in response to agriculture 
failure and famine inl959-1961; forest ownership and management 
devolved from commune to production team or production brigade; 
scattered trees returned to households. 
• 1966-1979; collectivization and scattered trees owned by households. 
1980s-1990s 
• Collective ownership dominant, but private trees and forests emerge. 
• Separation of use-rights to land and ownership. 
• Split of tree ownership and land ownership. 
• Many forms of forest management: household-based, collective, 
cooperation among households and between communities and external 
institutions. 
• 1981-1986; devolution of forest management; collective non-forest land and 
scrub forests distributed free of charge to households; collective forests 
contracted as responsibility hills; considerable deforestation. 
• 1993-present: lease of use-rights to non-forested land to rural households for 
terms of 50-100 years. 
Source: Liu Dachang (2003, p242) 
Manasement of State Forests in the Reform Era: 
Management of State and non-state forests alike has changed dramatically since 
the introduction of reforms in 1978 (Hyde et al., 2003; Rozelle et al., 2003; Albers et al., 
1998; Li, 2000; Liu, 2001). With the onset of reforms, China's first Basic Forest Law 
(1953) was essentially scrapped and a provisional forest law was established in 1984. 
The provision emphasized the indivisibility of State and collective property maintaining 
prohibitions against individuals managing or controlling collective forests (Ross, 1988). 
Additional policy reforms were enacted demanding a higher level of regeneration to 
felling ratio, promoting reforestation, and requiring the diversification of management 
and resource use while enhancing safety, forest protection and fire prevention standards 
(Richardson, 1990; Hyde, 2003).'^ The Ministry of Forestry was imable to successfiilly 
carry out the duties with which it was charged, so that by the late 1990's China's State 
managed forests were in serious trouble (Hyde, 2003; FAO, 2004). Overexploitation of 
high-graded mature forests resulted in a shift to harvesting immature young forests 
contributing to extreme imbalances in the age and structural quality of forest stands. It is 
estimated that 80% of China's forests are immature (Hyde et al., 2003; Richardson, 
1990). Ministry of Forestry statistics reported that the amount of land in timber 
production declined by 1%, while the volume decreased by 10.3% dxaring the same time 
period (Albers et al., 1998). Also, according to Zhao (1992), annual harvest rates were 
estimated to reach nearly five times the natural growth rates and, until the 1990s, 
reforestation after clearcutting was a rare exception. Consequently, forest resources have 
been exhausted and timber harvesting has been reduced to poor quality specimens. 
See Appendix 1, Table A "Major Forest Policies of the Reform Era." 
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Presently, China organizes its forest areas into six geographic regions and 
according to designations of State and non-state, or collective forests—depending on 
administrative control.^ "The State-owned forests include approximately 3,000 
independent forest farms and about 135 State forest bureaus. The bureaus control their 
own forest farms, and most of them control their own wood-processing facilities as well" 
(Hyde et al. 2003, p8). According to Hyde et al. (2003), the State forest bvireaus were 
initially established as logging operations in primary and well-developed secondary 
timber producing forests while the independent forest farms most commonly managed 
commercial plantations. Although bureaucratic lines of authority have changed 
frequently over the last 60 years, the independent forest farms currently obtain personnel 
and directives from local and provincial governments with each required to follow State 
Forest Administration (SFA) guidelines for forest management (Hyde et al., 2003). 
These SFA bureaus and forest farms represent the intended main target-groups of the 
NFPP. However, as will be shown later, the actual implementation of the NFPP is 
impacting a range of stakeholders beyond the intended target-group. ̂  
The Evolution of Collective, Non-state Forest Manasement Systems in the Reform Era: 
Collective, or non-state forests, were initially managed by collective production 
brigades in the commune era (pre 1978) with individual households gradually entering 
into a long-term (50-100 year) contract responsibility system for rights of usufruct to 
^ See page ix for a map of China's forest management regions. 
® Throughout this text "target-group" refers to the various individuals and divisions 
directly affiliated with the SFA (i.e. employees and administrators at the central 
provincial and local levels). "Non-targeted interested stakeholders" or "stakeholders" 
refer to those not employed in the SFA, but directly impacted by implementation of the 
NFPP (i.e. non-state forest enterprises, local governments, the service industry, 
subsistence farmers, indigenous minorities, etc.). 
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manage forestlands. "About 60% of China's total forestland now belongs to the 
collectives, and individual households manage about 80% of that" (Hyde et al., 2003, 
plO)^ It is the non-state, non-SFA forest enterprises that are largely the stakeholders 
most impacted by NFPP is being implementation. 
Figure 1: Percentage of 
Forestland Area by 
Managment Type in Cliina 
(1998) 
• State 
• Non-state 
Figure 2: Division of Non-state 
Managed Forestlands (1998) 
• Area Under 
Collective or 
Mixed-
ownership 
• Area Under 
Individual 
Householod 
Managemnt 
Since the 1980s, reforms have devolved decision-making authority from the 
collective to the household level (Richardson, 1990; Hyde, 2003). This type of 
decentralization is contrary to the decentralization from the State to the local community, 
as is the common trend in many other countries seeking optimal levels of 
decentralization. These policy changes were made based on the belief that a household 
responsibility system was a more efficient production model (Liu, 2003; Yamane, 2001). 
Today, land tenure is vastly different compared to the era of Chairman Mao 
(1949-1978). According to Liu (2001, p240), land ownership (separate from forest 
resource, or tree ownership) in contemporary China is either State- or collective-owned. 
Collective ownership includes the lands of townships, administrative villages, and village 
household groups (the equivalent to communes, production brigades, and production 
^ See Figures 1 and 2 
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teams respectively in the commune era). State ownership of forests is decreasing 
proportionately with increases in non-state forest management systems as the primary or 
well-developed stands administered by the SFA are harvested (SFA, 2000). However, 
according to State statistics, the conversion of State forests to non-state managed forests 
is occurring at different rates in China's six different forest regions. 
Table 2: Synonyms of Forest Management Systems in China Over Time. 
Source: 
Liu 
Dachang, 
2003, 
p242 
Also, separate from the reforms decentralizing ownership or decision-making 
control over land, the tenure of trees and forest resources is more complicated. Liu 
(2001, p240) notes four categories of tree and forest tenure in China: State-owned, 
collective-owned, private-owned and mixed-ownership in the form of shareholding 
systems. The last three categories are grouped together and collectively referred to as 
non-state forest management systems with the private-owned and mixed-ownership (part 
private, part collective) forest management systems as the most recent developments. 
These two types of management systems are based on policies separating rights of 
usufruct from land ownership with the understanding that "whoever plants the tree owns 
it" (Liu, 2001, p240). Table 3 serves to clarify these distinctions according to 
management type, tenurial arrangement, the type of land affected, the primary decision-
markers and current trends in expansion or recession of the management type. 
^ See Table 2, "Synonyms of Forest Management Systems in China Over Time." 
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1950-1958 1958-1983 1984-present 
Township Commune Township 
Advanced Cooperatives Production Brigade Administrative Villages 
Elementary 
Cooperatives 
Production Team Village Household Group 
{cunminzii) 
Table 3. Post-devolution Tenurial and Management Arrangements for State and Non-
state Forests. (Source: Hyde et al., 2003, p29) 
Management 
Type 
Tenurial 
Arrangement 
Type of 
Land 
Affected 
Primary 
Decision­
makers (for 
production and 
management) 
Trend in 
Area 
Covered 
State State Forests The central 
government holds 
exclusive rights of 
use and access 
Primary or 
well 
developed 
secondary 
timber 
stands 
The State Forest 
Administration, 
and provincial, 
prefectural, or 
county forest 
bureaus 
Decreasing 
proportion­
ately with 
increases in 
non-state 
management 
systems 
Non-
state 
Family Plots 
(ziliushan) 
The collective owns 
the land, but use 
rights are distributed 
to households. 
Trees planted on the 
land are the property 
of the households. 
Denuded 
forest-land 
and brush 
Households 
(what and where 
to plant, when 
and where to 
harvest and sell 
non-timber forest 
products) 
Expanding 
from 1980-
1987, steady 
since 
Non-
state 
Responsibility 
Hills 
(zerenshan) 
The collective owns 
the land and trees 
Existing 
forests and 
lands 
suitable for 
forest 
Shared between 
collectives and 
households 
Decreasing 
from 1984-
1990, steady 
since 
Non-
state 
Modified 
Collective 
(including 
collective 
forest farms) 
Collective 
ownership 
Existing 
forests and 
lands 
suitable for 
forest 
Village 
leadership, but 
with greater 
input and 
participation 
from villagers 
than before 
reforms 
Expanding 
slightly from 
1987-1990, 
steady since 
Non-
state 
Shareholding 
System 
(government 
dominate) 
The collective owns 
the land. Tree 
tenure has been 
unclear, although the 
name implies 
household 
ownership 
Existing 
forests and 
lands 
suitable for 
forest 
Board of trustees 
made up of 
village leaders 
and 
representatives 
of other 
shareholders 
Steady 
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Some clarification of the terms used in Table 3 may be needed. Family plots 
(ziliushan) refers to collective non-forested mountainous land that was allocated to rural 
households in the early 1980s in an attempt to encourage farmers to plant trees to meet 
their needs for tree products, especially fuelwood. Responsibility hills (zerenshan), on 
the other hand, refers to collective forests (and non-forested lands in some cases) that 
were contracted to households for management in the first half of the 1980s in an effort to 
improve management of existing forests and to establish new plantations (Liu, 2001, 
p259nl0). 
Forest manasement at the Household Level in China: 
But what does all of this really mean? What is life actually like at the household 
level for those engaged in the management of trees or forest enterprises? As mentioned, 
trees and forests in China may be managed by individuals, collectives and/or 
combinations of both with varying proportions of administrative responsibilities. Most 
revolution era communes had dissolved by 1980 and the collective forests were 
increasingly characterized by guidelines for production; they established systems of 
accountability and increased rights of usufruct. 
By 1983 there were 175,000 forest farms run by villages managing 
16.7 million hectares of hill and forest, of which 10.9 million was in 
forest. The ownership remained collective, but the individual trees (were) 
converted into shares and accorded a money value that (was) then 
allocated among the owners of the usufruct (Richardson, 1990). 
Although Beijing maintained restrictions on labor mobility, administration of 
nonagricultural activities steadily decentralized (Richardson, 1990). Decentralization 
encouraged diversification and specialization according to local resource availability and 
comparative advantage. The popularity of the reforms rested in more efficient 
16 
productivity fueled by market opportunities (Hyde et al., 2003). Government quotas for 
agriculture and timber were met and surpluses (a higher quality material) were sold on 
open markets. "The overall effect of the initial agricultural reforms was positive and 
impressive. Land productivity increased 225% between 1978 and 1984, and the 
productivity of agricultural labor increased by 172%" (Hyde et al., 2003). 
Greater familial wealth financed many new enterprises, including village forest 
farms (VFF's), a specialized type of township and village enterprise that entered into 
contracts with local administrations (Richardson, 1990). The VFF's arrangements fixed 
administrative responsibilities tying profits to performance, accounted for half of China's 
increase in per capita income during the 1980s, and were becoming more efficient than 
the larger State-owned enterprises (Hyde et al., 2003). 
Village forest farms evolved significantly during this period. Multiple households 
and individuals specialized in a great diversity of activities and worked together for the 
overall management of the collective forest area (Xu, 1986). Many joint ventures 
existed, such as regional/household, county/household, enterprise/forestry department, 
and timber production/timber processing ventures. According to Richardson (1990), 
since being required by new reform policies to contribute financially to reforestation, the 
major users of State wood often found it preferable to establish joint ventures with 
households and collectives to raise trees rather than pay levies to Beijing. Joint forest 
technical ventures were becoming more common undertaking specialized activities with 
VFFs. The activities that these enterprises engaged in included, for example, forest 
disease and pest control services, nursery management services, non-timber forest 
product production and horticultural product wholesalers (Richardson, 1990). In all parts 
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of the economy, the specialized households represent a significant departure from past 
policies. 
According to the State Forest Administration (2000), these groups (village forest 
farms and township and village enterprises) are still held accountable to national forest 
management guidelines, and are expected to report to local and provincial governments 
for personnel and planning. However, discrepancies and confusion regarding the exact 
extent of SFA authority over the collectives remains. Winkler (2004) notes that 
"contradicting sets of data reflect the fact that, although local communities are de jure 
owners of some forest areas, their ownership did neither entitle them to forest 
management (rights or profits)." Unfortunately, the nature of the NFPP's implementation 
may be ushering in a new cycle of uncertainty regarding rights of usufruct and 
contributing to an economic situation in China's southwest forest region that could drain 
the household savings accumulated in the 1990s period of growth and expansion. 
China's Southwestern Forest Manasement Region: 
The management of trees and forest resources in China's southwestern forest 
management region, comprised of Sichuan and Yunnan provinces, is the main 
consideration of this paper. This region is more complicated and difficult to define in 
comparison to China's other forest regions since it does not strictly adhere to either the 
State management model or the non-state system just described. For example, China's 
northeast forest region, which includes the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning, 
is a heavily forested area with many primary stands of large, economically valuable 
conifers (SFA, 2000).^ For this reason, and since the SFA is primarily interested in and 
^ See Appendix 2; China's Forest Resource Statistics 
18 
involved with large timber operations, 91% of the region's forestland is (in 1998) 
managed by the State Forest Administration leaving virtually no room for non-state forest 
management enterprises to operate in the northeast (SFA, 2000). By contrast, the 
southern collective region is named as such due to the prevalence of non-state forest 
management systems in that particular area. Over 89% of the region is (in 1998) 
managed by collective-owned, private-owned or mixed ownership shareholding systems 
specializing in a diversity of forest enterprise activities, such as those previously 
mentioned. The remaining 11% is comprised of SFA managed forests (SFA, 2000). 
The difficulty in defining forest management in China's southwest forest region 
comes from a general disagreement about which type of forest management system, State 
or non-state, is dominant. Ross (1988) considers forests in the southwestern part of 
China to be primarily State run due to larger timber volumes managed by the SFA. Sun 
(1992), on the other hand, views them as predominately collectively managed since non-
state forest enterprises manage a larger area of forestlands. In reality, forest management 
systems in the two provinces lay somewhere between these two designations, possessing 
both characteristics of State managed forests (t5^ical in northeastern China) and 
collective forests (common in the southern provinces). Hence, the common designation 
of the forest region (by the World Bank, 2003 and Hyde et al., 2003) as the southwest 
mixed-management forest region. Figures 3 and 4 help to illustrate this division more 
clearly. 
The southwestern forest management region plays a vital role in China's forest 
industry. It supplied over 10% of China's industrial timber in 1988, 22.1% and 10.9 
million m of the nation's forest cover and volume respectively in 1993 and accounted for 
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a significant proportion (17.3%) of the nation's plantation forests in 1993, according to 
the World Bank (2003), the FAO (2004) and the SFA (2000).'° 
Figure 3: Total Forest Volume 
by Management Type in 
China's Southwest Forest 
Region (1988-1998) 
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Figure 4: Total Forest Area by 
Managment Type in China's 
Southwest Forest Region 
(1988-1998) 
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Source: Zhang (2003, Tables 5-2 and 5-4) 
Land Tenure and the Management of China s Forests: 
As should be evident by the previous few paragraphs, even though the rapid 
policy changes have granted more control over resources at the local level, the changes 
have not been implemented consistently or uniformly across or within regions. Some 
regions (i.e. the southern collective region) were allowed to decentralize their forestry 
operations away from State management towards non-state management while other 
regions (the southwest mixed-management region) continue to struggle in establishing 
acceptable (according to the State) proportions of State to non-state forest management 
and tenure. 
Several researchers (i.e. Richardson, 1990; Hyde et al., 2003; World Bank, 2003; 
Liu, 2001) have examined land tenure in China, reform era policies and their effects on 
See Appendix 2: China's Forest Resource Statistics 
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forest management systems. These sources are useful for providing insights into the 
importance and inter-relationships between land tenure, tenure security and people's trust 
in government policy and reforms. Richardson (1990, p29) mentions problems with the 
decentralization of decision-making control during the Cultural Revolution, which was 
marked by the transfer of resources from central to local control. Yet, in his words, "it 
failed because it was administrative control only that was transferred—^not decision­
making capacity, which at all levels remained with government agencies rather than 
production enterprises." Hyde et al. (2003, pi7) observe that the impredictable and 
inconsistent nature of policies reforming land tenure have resulted, often negatively, in 
the way in which forest resources are managed. They note that "frequent policy 
experimentation creates uncertainty and imposes significant environmental and social 
costs" (Hyde et al., 2003, pl7). 
The World Bank (2003) echoes the above Hyde et al. (2003) comment by 
asserting that data from a recent multivariate analysis clearly shows that forest use 
patterns, particularly within the non-state sector, vary significantly by forest tenure type. 
Their findings confirm that increases in forest area occur more frequently in locations 
where individuals have more control and income rights (especially in China's southern 
and southwestern regions). Liu (2001) also describes how trust on the part of households 
managing forests towards the State has been eroded due primarily to the frequency of 
policy change since the early 1980s and subsequent removal of rights of usufiiict 
supposedly granted by the policy reforms. He notes that the result of frequent policy 
changes is an atmosphere of uncertainty leading to attempts at preempting government 
withdrawal of rights granted by policy reforms. "This high frequency of policy change 
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has undermined farmers' confidence in policy, even policies that they favor. This has 
encouraged the rapid conversion of forest resources by farmers even when they enjoy 
management rights" (Liu, 2001, p239). This uncertain policy atmosphere, which reduces 
trust and encourages the extraction of resources, also discourages shifts from collective to 
household-based management of forest resources on a sustainable level and the 
investment in forest resources for the future. Essentially, this situation removes an 
otherwise very promising avenue for rural people to generate income by sustainably 
managing their natural resources and replaces it with a situation that accelerates 
extraction of natural resources while providing only short-term, non-sustainable 
economic opportunities. The significance of tenure security for the management of non-
state forests in China cannot be underestimated; however, neither can the continued 
influence and authority of the State—especially in the form of the Natural Forest 
Protection Plan and the manner of its implementation. 
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Chapter 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Development, implementation and modification of China's Natural Forest 
Protection Plan has been taking place in a hyper-dynamic cultural context with complex 
social, political and economic factors at play since 1998 (Jintao et al., 2002). The 
purpose of this literature review is to identify what is currently known about the 
development and implementation of the NFPP, particularly in its relation to China's 
southwest forest region. The goal is to determine what unanswered questions remain. 
The contribution of this paper is that it addresses those unanswered questions and 
explains why those answers are needed. 
Sinkule and Ortolano (1995) supply a basic framework for examining the design 
of environmental policy in China. Their framework helps to establish and organize what 
is currently known about the design of the NFPP. They cite the following as necessary 
aspects to consider when examining the design of a policy (in the Chinese context): 
• examine how and why the policy was initiated 
• identify policy goals and purpose 
• establish the scale and context 
• reveal the organization of management and staffing 
• identify the resources committed to the program (i.e.—budgeting and finance) 
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• recognize the target-groups involved and identify non-targeted interested 
stakeholders 
A substantial quantity of information regarding each of the aforementioned points 
is necessary in order to collate what is known about the NFPP. Fortunately, the China 
Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) 
established the Western China Forests and Grasslands Task Force (hereafter "Task 
Force") in July 2000 "to support the government in the ecologically, socially, and 
economically sustainable development of forests and grasslands in western China" 
(Jintao et al., 2002, pi). The CCICED is a multi-disciplinary, multi-national team 
chaired by members of the Chinese Academy of Engineering and the World Bank. "The 
council makes annual recommendations to the Chinese government, at the highest level, 
on the formulation and implementation of long-term strategies and policies for 
sustainable development" (Jintao et al., 2002, plnl). 
The Task Force was given a two-year assigimient with the mandate to identify 
relevant knowledge on western China's forests and grasslands and to address planning 
and implementation gaps in the Natural Forest Protection Plan (NFPP) and the Sloping 
Land Conversion Program (SLCP).'' They were also contracted to address the linkages 
between the implementation of the NFPP/SLCP and poverty alleviation development in 
western China (Jintao et al., 2002). The Task Force was required to provide independent 
advice on policy reforms in the forestry sector and related sectors to the national State 
" The Sloping Land Conversion Program is a policy sub-component introduced into the 
NFPP framework in 1999. The expanded policy requires the conversion of all 
agricultural plots exceeding 25 degrees in regions covered by the NFPP to forests or 
grasslands. 
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Council and policymakers at central and provincial levels. Over 1,400 household level 
surveys were administered at 10 case study sites in nine western provinces and focused 
on the underlying socio-economic issues revealed by the case studies (Jintao et al., 2002). 
Additional policy issues impacting the forestry sector were identified and the technical 
feasibility of the policy was evaluated. The Task Force studies are among the few 
sources of literature published regarding the topic and represent the vast majority of what 
is known about the NFPP and its current status. Therefore, a large portion of the 
following information presented is based on their case studies. 
Orisin of the NFPP: 
Implementing forest policies in China has historically been constrained by many 
factors. Some obstacles to the successful implementation of forest and environmental 
policies in China have traditionally included limited forest resources, ambiguous 
proclamation and inconsistent application of policy statutes, insufficient funds, extensive 
ecological destruction, massive population pressures, constrained managerial and 
scientific research capacity and rudimentary environmental awareness among the general 
public (see Harkness, 1998; Richardson, 1990; Hyde et al., 2003). Into a context of 
dynamic reforms and historically weak implementation, the Natural Forest Protection 
Plan was launched. The initial stages of implementation took place on a pilot level in 
1998 and 1999, with full implementation beginning in 2000 and scheduled to continue 
through 2010 (Jintao et al., 2002). Implementation was not uniformly applied in the 18 
provinces for which the plan encompasses yet the main goals of reversing the alarming 
rates of decline in natural forests and watershed cover remain consistent (Jintao et al., 
2002). 
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The tremendous floods of 1998 provided the policy window of opportunity for the 
establishment of the NFPP and the implementation of an almost nationwide logging ban. 
Typically, policy formation in China involves a top down approach. Atypically, the 
earliest logging bans in Yunnan and Sichuan were suggested by the provincial 
governments and then accepted at the central level (Jintao et al., 2002). The central 
government identified general areas of concern (i.e.—flood control and watershed 
stability), then set the annual goals for the program and mandated local governments to 
prepare their own annual implementation plans (Jintao et al., 2002). The local 
governments were then charged with the task of implementing their plans according to 
the final budget set in Beijing. After an ongoing monitoring process, auditing is carried 
out and the implementation is evaluated with recommendations and financial 
disbursements made for next year's plan according to the results (Jintao et al., 2002). 
The provincial, or non-central origin of the NFPP, suggests that it is perceived as 
important by a significant portion of society (350 million people in the Yangtze 
watershed) and several key decision-makers. Many locals, generally urban residents, 
business owners and farmers in the Sichuan basin floodplain, continue to voice concerns 
about increasingly frequent and severe floods while Beijing recognizes the potential 
financial costs associated with floods and deforestation in the nation's largest watersheds. 
Goals and Purpose: 
The Natural Forest Protection Plan is a forest policy primarily directed at 
reforming the heavily timber-dependent State forestry sector. It mandates the State 
Forestry Administration to counter the impacts of deforestation. During a fact-finding 
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mission to Sichuan in the fall of 1999, according to Winkler (2004), Chinese Premier Zhu 
Rongji elucidated the six following goals of the new government policy: 
• All logging activities in the designated areas were to cease and remaining 
(primary/timber) forest stands protected. 
• Financial and managerial adjustments at all levels of the SFA would be made 
and massive restructuring of the forestry sector, especially State timber 
enterprises, would take place. 
• State forest workers are to be re-deploy as stewards and planters, as opposed 
to their previous occupations as loggers and sawyers with compensation for 
those who must be laid-off. 
• The conversion of sloped agricultural lands (generally over 25 degrees) to 
secondary forests or commercial plantations utilizing a food for work program 
(the SLCP) shall take place. 
• An effective reforestation and forest protection management system is to be 
developed. 
• Wood product needs and demands are to be satisfied while reducing rural 
firewood dependency and diversifying the rural economy. 
According to Lu Wenming (1999), a professor at the Chinese Academy of 
Forestry in Beijing, these goals are consistent with each other and their impacts will be 
positive. He asserts that the program will increase the quantity and improve the quality 
of natural forest resources while establishing a new source of economic growth. He 
further claims that new employment opportunities will be created thereby increasing per 
capita income through a successful transition of forest industries and the establishment of 
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large-scale commercial forests. Finally, "the reforms in forest areas shall be further 
deepened so as to achieve radical transitions both from planned economy to market-
oriented economy and from extensive management to intensive management, and to 
finally realize sustainable forest management and establish a scientific forestry 
management system" (Lu, 1999, pi). How^ever, a deeper inspection into the NFPP shows 
the difficulty of implementing such a broad and ambitious program and achieving goals 
that may not be as complimentary to each other as the professor suggests. 
Scale and Context: 
The Natural Forest Protection Plan is a profound change in policy that applies to 
over half of China's provinces and autonomous regions, land area and population. 
Seemingly, the primary focus of the policy is toward China's southwestern forest region. 
This region is where the first logging bans occurred and where severe flooding continues 
to be an ominous threat. Over 350 million people live in the Sichuan basin and Yangtze 
River floodplain with hundreds of thousands more living in the Hengduan Mountains that 
comprise the area's upper watershed (Chinatoday, 2005). The vast majority of mountain 
inhabitants are comprised of ethnic minorities—groups of people often lagging behind 
the Han majority in educational opportunity and economic prosperity (CEPF, 2002). 
Most minority groups still depend heavily on traditional, subsistence-based activities that 
are closely linked to the moxmtain-forests where they dwell (Coggins, 2003). Fuelwood 
and non-timber forest product collection, pasturing and swidden agriculture are primary 
livelihood activities for those living in this region of China (Winkler, 2004). The logging 
ban will be in effect until at least 2010, necessarily resulting in broad socio-economic 
impacts (Jintao et al., 2002). These impacts not only affect timber-based enterprises and 
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those who formerly depended on them, but they also affect the area's ethnic minorities 
whose access to their traditional forests has been significantly altered due to the policy. 
Manasement Orsanization and Staffing: 
Figure 5: SFA and NFPP Organizational Structure 
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The government agencies involved with the development and implementation of 
the NFPP are situated at many levels, including the national, provincial, county and 
township levels with the SFA playing a central role (Jintao et al., 2002).'^ The central 
government has ultimate decision-making power with the State Council, the State 
Development and Planning Commission, and the Ministry of Finance comprising other 
essential decision-making bodies at the national level. These agencies provide planning, 
legislative, and financial support for the program. 
At the local level (including the provincial and county levels), 
departments involved in preparations and financing of implementation 
include the planning, finance, and social insurance departments. At the 
central level, local forestry departments (or the State forestry bureaus) are 
the actual implementers of the program. Local governments are 
responsible for identifying priority areas for NFPP implementation, 
providing the necessary support (such as matching funds), and overseeing 
implementation within the jurisdictions (Ting in Jintao et al., 2002, p2). 
A new government agency, the Center for Natural Forest Control and 
Management is the leading implementing agency at the State level and provides ongoing 
monitoring reports to the State Council (Katsagiris in Jintao et al., 2002). According to 
the CCICED Task Force (2002), NFPP management centers have been established as 
permanent institutions at various levels of the government and are responsible for 
supervising and auditing the project. Oversight groups are generally comprised of 
powerful individuals fi-om various govenmiental departments and, in practice, forestry 
departments usually play the most important role. 
However, staff sizes at special NFPP implementation offices are generally small. 
"As an example, the General Office of the Sichuan NFPP Leading Group was established 
See Figure 5: SFA and NFPP Organizational Structure. 
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in 1998 with two full-time employees" (Katsigris in Jintao et al., 2002, p 4). NFPP 
designated ranger teams are small and cover large areas due to budgetary constraints 
(Jintao et al., 2002). Despite insufficient monitoring and enforcement staff, the teams are 
expected to plant trees, augment existing plantings, prevent illegal logging, prevent fires 
and raise public awareness (Katsagiris in Jintao et al., 2002). 
Budsetins and Finance: 
According to the CCICED Task Force report (2002), eighty percent of the 
implementing costs are provided by the central government with the remaining 20% 
provided at the provincial level and lower. Appropriations are made to provincial finance 
departments through State budgetary channels before being released to the forestry 
departments at the provincial level. The provincial SFA departments are then required to 
use the funds to cover capital expenses (i.e. tree planting, nursing seedlings and fire 
prevention) and operational expenses (i.e. forest maintenance, pensions and 
compensations) according to budget requirements and approved implementation plans. A 
total of 3.12 billion yuan (over $350 million US), representing almost 87% of the national 
budget for the top ten "key" environmental programs was earmarked for the NFPP in the 
second half of 1998 (Jintao et al, 2002). The 2002 Task Force case studies claim that 
roughly half of this was allocated to national coffers while the other half found its way to 
progressively lower institutional levels of the local and provincial NFPP management 
centers. 
Tarset-srouvs and Interested Stakeholders: 
A vast cross-section of China's population is deeply impacted by the NFPP and 
the nature of its implementation (Jintao, 2002). These affected groups and individuals 
31 
may be divided into two main camps; 1) target-groups and 2) non-targeted interested 
stakeholders. As previously mentioned, the intended target group of the NFPP is the 
State Forest Administration's executives, managers and employees. Prior to the 
establishment of the NFPP, the SFA as an organization and its staff were the ones 
primarily involved with large-scale timber operations and were viewed as the ones 
mainly responsible for the denuded condition of the nation's major watersheds (Hyde et 
al., 2003; Richardson, 1990). A key component of the NFPP, the logging ban, is 
therefore intended to apply to SFA timber operations only. 
Non-state forest enterprises, however, also operate in the regions targeted by the 
NFPP. Even though the majority of these enterprises are engaged in the development and 
management of secondary stands, orchards or woodlots established in areas previously 
harvested and abandoned by the SFA, restrictions on their management have been 
extended by local implementers of the NFPP for various reasons (World Bank, 2003). 
The individuals, households and collective or mixed-management, non-state 
organizations involved with the management of forest resources comprise one third of the 
non-targeted interested stakeholders. A second third includes those not directly involved 
with forest enterprises, but who benefited from the industry's presence in the region. 
Some examples of these stakeholders include hospitality enterprises, transportation 
services, local governments (via stumpage taxes), etc. These stakeholders are impacted 
due to the removal of a key source of income in the region, up to 80% of local incomes in 
some prefectures according to the 2002 Task Force studies. The final third is basically 
the urbanites and residents in major floodplains who are threatened by seasonal flooding 
and stand to benefit or suffer from the success or failure of the NFPP. 
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Policy Desisn Summary: 
In summary, the Natural Forest Protection Plan was initiated in 1998 primarily for 
the purpose of stabilizing some of China's major watersheds. The objectives of the 
program include both social and ecological goals. The primary provisions of the NFPP 
are the cessation of logging in demarcated areas and the reforestation of degraded sloped 
lands while simultaneously, and seemingly contradictorily, meeting the nation's growing 
wood product needs. Included in the program are the more developmental goals of 
reducing rural firewood dependency and improving rural livelihoods through 
diversification of the economy away from the timber-dependent model existing 
previously. Special oversight and management groups have been established to 
administer the program and unprecedented amounts of financial resources have been 
allocated for the program. Although the State Forest Administration is considered the 
primary target-group of the NFPP, the immense breadth and depth of the policy directly 
impacts a large number of non-targeted interested stakeholders. 
Perceptions of these stakeholders towards the new policy vary widely and are 
influenced, in large part, by the method of its implementation. There are possible sources 
of resistance with any policy and the NFPP is no different. Individuals and organizations 
directly involved with State or non-state forest management in NFPP areas may resist 
changes that fundamentally and permanently alter their livelihoods while those not 
directly involved with the forest sector are concerned about anticipated secondary socio­
economic impacts and may also resist implementation of the program (Jintao et al., 
2002). 
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A significant amount of information regarding what is currently known about the 
NFPP, its goals and target-groups, its management and funding, has just been presented. 
However, some important questions remain and require explanation. How is the policy 
being implemented—specifically what effects is it having and how are target-groups and 
stakeholders responding? And what are the policy outputs thus far? The more thorough 
analysis of its implementation that follows helps to answer these questions more 
decisively. However, a clear plan and framework for conducting the necessary analysis 
and determine the effectiveness of the NFPP in producing the desired outcomes is 
required, and thus, is presented in the following chapter. 
Chapter 4 
METHODS 
While serving as an environmental educator at Sichuan University in the 2002-
2003 academic year, I was privy to an excellent atmosphere in which to develop an 
understanding of both China's complicated socio-political situation and its sometimes 
overwhelming environmental challenges. Teaching environmental science at one of the 
nation's top universities and in one of its most biodiverse and threatened environments 
resulted in numerous collaborations. Leaming from and interacting with several of 
China's most dynamic environmentalists, NGOs, political leaders and students, as well as 
leaming from their international counterparts and colleagues was an invaluable 
experience. As such, I was afforded the first-hand opportunity to delve deeper into the 
conundrum that is forest ecosystem and environmental management in western China. 
Personal experience and observations serve as the inspiration for this text while 
informing it's content. Involvement with park rangers, SFA managers, government 
officials and Chinese NGOs has provided essential interactions for consideration. 
Additionally, interactions with international NGOs, researchers and scholars have fiirther 
contributed to an understanding of China's environmental issues in general, and the 
impact of the NFPP specifically. Personal experiences, together with additional texts, 
case studies and a modified version of the Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) conceptual 
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framework are applied and considered in an effort to analyze the NFPP and its 
implementation in China's southwest forest management region. The purpose of this 
analysis is to assess the effectiveness of the policy at achieving the desired outcomes. 
Regarding implementation of a given policy, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) 
view the identification of factors affecting the achievement of statutory objectives 
through implementation of a specific policy as the crucial role of the implementation 
analysis. The researchers divide those factors into three broad categories: 1) the 
tractability of the problems being addressed by the statute, 2) the ability of the statute to 
favorably structure the implementation process, and 3) the net effect of a variety of 
"political" variables on the balance of support for statutory objectives (see Figure 6). The 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) framework was chosen for this analysis precisely 
because of this clear delineation between independent variables and their relation to 
policy outcomes. In comparison to other models available for policy analysis, the 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) framework is the most complete and the most adaptable 
for application in non-western contexts. The framework is now presented as it appears in 
Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) paper "A Conceptual Framework of the 
Implementation Process." It should be noted at this time, however, that the framework is 
subsequently modified to suit the particular needs of this inquiry and the Chinese specific 
context. The nature and extent of these modifications are more clearly delineated later in 
this chapter. 
Tractability of the problem refers to the extent, range and complexity of the issues 
being addressed by a given policy. The implied assumption is that modifying the 
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behavior of target-groups will ameliorate problems and that some problems are more 
tractable, and therefore more easily controlled, than others. 
This brief review of the variables involved suggests that problems 
are most tractable if (1) there is a valid theory connecting behavioral 
change to problem amelioration; the requisite technology exists; and, 
measurement of change in the seriousness of the problem is inexpensive; 
(2) there is minimal variation in the behavioral practices that cause the 
problem; (3) the target-group constitutes an easily identifiable minority of 
the population within a political jurisdiction; and (4) the amount of 
behavioral changed is modest (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, pi56). 
Tractability of the Problem 
Source: 
Sabatier 
and 
Mazmanian 
(1980) 
Conceptual 
Framework of 
the 
Implementation 
Process 
1. Availability of valid technical theoiy and 
technology 
2. Diversity of target-group behavior 
3 Target-group as a percentage of the population 
4- Extent of behavioral change required 
Policy outputs 
of implementing 
agencies 
Stages (Dependent Variables) in the Implementation Process 
Compliance with Actual _ Perceived Major 
policy outputs by ""impacts of impacts of revision in 
target-groups policy outputs policy outputs statute 
1. Socio-economic conditions and 
technology 
2. Media attention to the problem 
3. Public support 
4. Attitudes and resources of 
constituency groups 
5. Support from sovereigns 
6. Commitment and leadership skill of 
implementing officials 
Non-statutory Variables Affecting 
Implementation 
1. Clear and consistent objectives 
2. Incorporation of adequate causal theory 
3. Financial resources 
4. Hierarchical integration with and 
among implementing institutions 
5. Decision-rules of implementing 
agencies 
6. Recruitment of implementing officials 
7. Formal access by outsiders 
Ability of Statute to Structure 
Implementation 
According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), statutory and political variables 
affect the mobilization of resources necessary for instituting behavioral change. The 
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statute establishes the purpose of a given policy and stipulates the objectives to be 
pursued. The clarity and specificity of a statute also have the ability to structure the 
entire implementation process. 
In sum, a carefully drafted statute can substantially affect the 
extent to which its objectives are attained. More precisely, legislation that 
seeks to significantly change target-group behavior in order to achieve its 
objectives is most likely to succeed if (1) its objectives are precise and 
clearly ranked; (2) it incorporates a valid causal theory; (3) it provides 
adequate funds to the implementing agencies; (4) the number of veto 
points in the implementation process is minimized and 
sanctions/inducements are provided to overcome resistance; (5) the 
decision-rules of the implementing agencies are biased toward the 
achievement of statutory objectives; (6) implementation is assigned to 
agencies that support the legislation's objectives and will give the program 
high priority; and (7) the provisions for outsider participation are similarly 
biased through liberalized rules of standing and by centralizing oversight 
in the hands of statutory supporters (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, 
pl61). 
Non-statutory variables also affect the implementation process in two significant 
ways: 1) by providing sufficient political support to reach a maximum threshold of 
cooperation among stakeholders—a requirement for successful institution of statutory 
objectives, and by 2) managing changing socio-economic conditions to maintain public 
support for policy changes (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980). The major non-statutory 
variables affecting implementation according to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) are 
socio-economic conditions and technology, public support, attitudes and resources of 
constituency groups, support from sovereigns, commitment and leadership skill of 
implementing officials and the level of media attention to the problem. 
The final component of Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) conceptual framework 
for analyzing the implementation process concerns the evaluation of dependent variables. 
These variables have been separated into five distinct stages by the analysts: 1) the policy 
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outputs (decisions) of the implementing agencies, 2) the compliance of target-groups with 
those decisions, 3) the actual impacts of agency decisions, 4) the perceived impacts of 
those decisions, and 5) the political system's evaluation of a statute in terms of major 
revisions (or attempted revisions) in its content. 
For the piupose of this investigation and given the unique context of inquiry, the 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) conceptual framework was modified before being 
1 ^ 
applied to analyze the NFPP and its implementation to date. Although the Sabatier and 
Mazmanian (1980) framework was chosen, in part, due to its applicability in a variety of 
contexts, alteration of the model is necessary in order to accentuate the significance of 
land tenure in China and the impact that it has on the management of trees and forest 
resources, particularly in the southwestern region of the country. Changes were made in 
an effort to condense and streamline the analysis by combining the more similar aspects 
of the model and eliminating those for which there is insufficient information or that 
contribute little to the goal of determining the effectiveness of NFPP implementation in 
producing the desired policy outcomes. A more explicit separation between the 
dependent variables and what Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) call the tractability and 
(non-) statutory variables is established. Subsequently, Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) 
designated categories of "tractability of the problem," "ability of statute to structure 
implementation," and "non-statutory variables affecting implementation" are considered 
sub-components under the penumbral designation of independent variables. Each of 
these independent variable sub-components retain their Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) 
" See Figure 7: Modified Framework for Analyzing Forest Policy Implementation in 
China. 
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titles and defined meanings, however, their own component parts have been reorganized 
and supplemented in a few essential ways. 
Figure 7; Modifii^ Framework 
fctrAnail^ziBg Policy 
Implemeiitatioii in China 
: 
Tractability of the 
Problem 
1. Availability of 
valid technical 
theory 
2. Target-group 
size, diversity 
and extent of 
change required 
3. Socio-political 
and historical 
context 
Statutory 
Variables 
1. Clear and 
consistent 
objectives 
2. Hierarchical 
integration 
and decision-
rules 
3. Financial 
resources 
4. Formal access 
by outsiders 
: 
Non-statutory Variables 
1. Socio-economic 
conditions, land tenure 
(certainty), and attitudes 
of constituency groups 
2. Commitment, expertise, 
leadership skill and 
resources of implementing 
officials and support from 
sovereigns 
3. Media attention to the 
problem and public 
support 
""V 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Policy Outputs of 
implementing 
agencies 
Compliance 
with Policy 
Outputs 
Actual and Perceived 
Impacts of Policy 
Outputs 
EVALUATION OF THE POLICY'S SUCCESS, 
FAILURE OR EFFECTIVNESS IN ATTAINING 
THE STATED GOALS OR OUTCOMES 
The "tractability" sub-component retains the "availability of valid technical 
theory" element while combining elements 2, 3 and 4 from the Sabatier and Mazmanian 
(1980) model now referred to as "target group size, diversity and extent of change 
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required." Given China's unique social, political and historical context, especially in 
terms of implementing environmental policy and in contrast to western, more European-
American contexts, a third element of the tractability sub-component is established. 
Essentially, the "socio-political historical context" variable recognizes the significant 
difference between China's history of enviroimiental policy design and implementation in 
comparison to the west, and considers precedent within the established context as a 
necessary variable to consider when assessing the tractability of problems addressed by 
theNFPP. 
"Incorporation of adequate causal theory" has been removed as a statutory 
variable and is now integrated into the first element of the tractability sub-component for 
convenience and avoidance of repetition. Likewise, "decision-rules of implementing 
agencies" has been combined with the "hierarchical integration" statute variable for 
similar reasons. Also, "recruitment of implementing officials" has been dropped as a 
statutory variable due to its limited contribution to the analysis while a central 
independent variable for consideration has been added. Land tenure and tenure security 
in China, as previously mentioned in the background chapter, is an issue of primary 
concern and debate in association with the NFPP and its implementation. Indeed, this 
one variable, or most certainly when taken together with the "socio-economic conditions" 
and the "attitudes and resources of constituency groups" independent variable elements, 
may very well determine the success or failure of the NFPP and cannot be overlooked or 
xmderstated. Due to the interrelated nature of these three subjects, they have been 
combined into one element for analysis under the independent variable sub-component of 
"non-statutory variables affecting implementation" in the modified framework. 
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Finally, the dependent variable component of the Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) 
model is also modified. Instead of Sabatier and Mazmanian's five sub-component parts, 
the dependent variables are considered as a whole and analyzed concurrently with the 
analysis of the independent variables. This approach is taken in order to draw a more 
distinct connection between each aspect of the independent variables and the policy 
outcomes themselves. The outputs of NFPP implementation and the implementing 
agency are further specified throughout the findings chapter and are directly related to the 
actual policy outcomes resulting from the manner in which the NFPP is implemented. 
This new modified framework is applied by analyzing existing reports, case 
studies and personal experience. Although the Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) 
framework is intended to be utilized as an analytic tool that reviews a given policy's 
implementation from start to finish, the modified Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) 
framework is applied in order to determine effectiveness of implementation halfway 
through the NFPP's lifespan. In an effort to critically examine implementation of the 
NFPP to date, a standard of evaluation is established to assess each dependent variable 
according to its influence on implementation. Clarke and McCool (1996) provide some 
useful suggestions for making such assessments in their book Staking Out the Terrain: 
Power and Performance among Natural Resource Agencies. Clarke and McCool (1996) 
utilize a three-part ordinal scale in order to assess and compare the power and 
performance of various U.S. government agencies. For each variable analyzed, the 
authors use a'+' to indicate a positive influence or characteristic inherent in the variable, 
ato represent negative influences or characteristics and a '0' to signify aspects of the 
variable that has no discemable effect on policy outcomes. 
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A similar approach is utilized in this text in order to assist in analysis of the 
NFPP. In this case, the '+' sign indicates that a variable or aspect of a variable has 
positively contributed to, or enhanced, policy implementation and the achievement of 
NFPP goals. The sign represents that a variable or aspect of a variable has negatively 
affected or impeded successful implementation. A '0' sign deems that a variable or 
aspect of a variable was neutral or contributed equivalently, both positively and 
negatively, to implementation of the NFPP and achievement of the stated goals. The 
'0' scale is organized into tables on pages 55, 71-72 and 89-90 for the impact of 
tractability, statutory and non-statutory variables on policy outcomes respectively. 
Following presentation of the findings, the discussion section considers all of the 
previous information and clarifies the most significant factors affecting implementation 
of the NFPP. Subsequently, several recommendations are made for improving the NFPP, 
its implementation and, consequently, the achievement of its goals. However, will the 
recommended changes improve the likelihood of meeting the stated policy goals, or is 
alteration of the policy goals themselves required if the NFPP is to be considered 
successfiil? Also worth considering is whether or not the existing socio-political context 
is too constraining for any meaningful success to be attained? The following chapter now 
leads us toward answering these questions through application of the modified 
framework for analyzing China's implementation of the Natural Forest Protection Plan. 
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Chapter 5 
FINDINGS 
The following section applies the modified version of Sabatier and Mazmanian's 
(1980) conceptual framework for analyzing the implementation of environmental 
policies. The independent and dependent variables are examined in detail and evaluated 
through an analysis of their sub-component parts. First the complexity of the policy and 
the level of behavioral change required by the NFPP are ascertained and the likelihood of 
the required changes to address the problems of watershed stability and management is 
determined. Second, the statutory and non-statutory variables affecting implementation 
are likewise assessed. An examination of the dependent variables, as indicators of policy 
effectiveness, requiring consideration occurs concurrently with the analysis of the 
independent variables and rounds out the implementation analysis section of this text. 
The purpose of this analysis is to determine the success of the Natural Forest Protection 
Plan and the effectiveness of its implementation. Effectiveness, in this case, is 
determined in terms of the NFPP's ability to achieve the stated goals of eliminating 
destructive timber practices and protecting remaining stands in target areas, revegetation 
of lands already denuded, restructuring the management and operations of the State 
Forest Administration, and diversification of the rural economy while reducing rural 
dependence on fuel wood and meeting the nation's wood product needs. Ultimately, the 
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effectiveness of the NFPP is not only determined by its ability to produce these outputs, 
but also in its ability to produce the desired outcome of long-term watershed stability. 
Analysis of the Tractability Variables 
The presence of a valid causal theory connecting stakeholder behavior to problem 
amelioration and the existence of the technology required to implement the policy are 
examined below to determine the tractability of the problems addressed by the NFPP. 
The amount of variation in behavioral practices, the distinctness of the target-groups and 
the amount of behavior change required are also investigated in order to assess 
tractability. 
Availability of a Valid Technical Theory: 
NFPP policy planners at the central level assume that recent or historical forest 
management approaches are responsible for reductions in vegetative cover resulting in 
the floods of 1998 (Liu, J., 1998). They also assume that a ban on logging in the main 
watersheds, the development of a different forest management system, and the 
reforestation of sloped "wastelands" will ameliorate the target problems (Liu, J., 1998). 
The validity of this causal theory is questionable given uncertain correlations between 
decreases in forest cover and increases in the frequency and severity of floods within the 
targeted watersheds (Bruijnzeel, L, 2004). Additionally, regulating hydrologic flow may 
not reduce socio-economic impacts of downstream flooding due to ever increasing 
populations and valuable infrastructure being established on perennial floodplains. 
Although no new technology is required to implement the NFPP, suggesting that the 
target problems Eire easily tractable, policy designers believe that they will be able to 
restructure a massive government bureaucracy, protect and reforest millions of hectares 
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while increasing domestic wood production, and that they will be able to do so with a 
greatly depleted workforce which needs to be thoroughly retrained. Furthermore, they 
seek to accomplish all of this while simultaneously diversifying the rural economy 
(Winkler, 2004). These assumptions are questionable. 
There is ample evidence in China's recent history for its ability to completely 
restructure entire industrial sectors—^the agricultural sector is a prime example 
(Richardson, 1990). The Green Wall of China also provides justification for believing 
that the nation is capable of conducting large-scale reforestation projects (Xinhua, April 
29,2004). The ability of NFPP implementers to meet the remaining goals, though, is a 
bit more dubious. Liu et al. (1999,2001) and Lu et al. (2002) provide strong evidence for 
their claims that China is not very successful in its efforts to curtail illegal timber 
practices even within its most prestigious protected areas. However, even if the central 
government strongly and effectively enforces the logging ban according to NFPP 
mandates, that would only reduce the nation's ability to meet its domestic wood demand. 
Domestic consumption of wood products has been increasingly outpacing production in 
recent years even with virtually imrestrained timber harvesting prior to the logging ban 
(SAF, 2004). Additionally, the ability and capacity for China to retrain former timber 
operators into a new generation of ecosystem and watershed managers is questionable 
(Richardson, 1990). Support for this claim and the issue in general is dealt with in more 
detail under the non-statutory variable "commitment, expertise, leadership skill and 
resources." 
Possibly most curious among the main goals of the NFPP is the socio-economic 
objective of diversifying the rural economy. It is unclear how this goal relates directly to 
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reducing the flooding hazard through a revegetated watershed. Naturally, one could 
argue that more affluent rural households operating in a more stable free-market 
economy, rather than a natural resource-based subsistence economy, is ultimately better 
for the environment and could possibly lead to increases in forest cover (see Liu et 
al.l999,2001 and Lu et al., 2002). However, this is not the argument made by the policy 
developers and those who implement the NFPP (Winkler, 2004). Instead, this goal seems 
tacked on as a rider to the more central environmental goals of the NFPP. The presence 
of a valid causal theory connecting stakeholder behavior to problem amelioration, in this 
case, is questionable. 
Tarset-sroup Size, Diversity and the Extent of Chanse Required: 
The NFPP helped to orient and establish needed direction for the fledgling SFA 
by providing several goals and objectives for the agency. The intention of the policy was 
to change the ways in which China's forests are managed primarily by the State, but also 
by non-state managers, for the purpose of increasing watershed stability. Traditionally, 
State agencies (specifically, the MOF) were the only actors allowed to conduct logging 
and timber activities on any significant scale (Richardson, 1990). Hence, the logging ban 
aspect of the NFPP essentially targets SFA timber operators and the ways in which they 
conduct their business. On the other hand, denuded, primarily sloped agricultural land 
has increasingly been leased to collective and non-state users over the last 25 years (Liu, 
2001; Richardson, 1990; Hyde et al., 2003). It is precisely these lands and those who 
lease them that are targeted by the other main goal of the NFPP—increasing watershed 
stability through the conversion of lands exceeding 25% in slope to secondary forests and 
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sustainably managed commercial plantations (i.e.—^the Sloping Land Conversion 
Program). 
In conforming to the logging ban mandate, the SFA is expected to downsize by 
roughly 33%, from a workforce of about 3 million to one measuring arovmd 2 million 
(Jintao et al., 2002). According to the 2002 CCICED Task Force report, these former 
timber operators are expected to take on the new roles of forest rangers and stewards 
responsible for eliminating illegal forest activities such as timber harvesting, poaching 
and non-timber forest product collection. They are also expected to manage against 
forest fire, conduct research, initiate reforestation activities and pursue public awareness 
campaigns. Furthermore, each level of the SFA (national, provincial and local) develops 
its own management protocol suited to their particular needs and not always in a manner 
consistent with national forest management policies or priorities. The State target-group 
represents a substantial portion of the population (up to 80%) in prefectures affected by 
the NFPP, while the potentially affected population within the 18 provinces covered by 
the policy exceeds several hundred million (Jintao et al., 2002). Furthermore, the regions 
where this initiative is being carried out is home to many of China's ethnic minorities, 
each with their own, deeply ingrained customs, beliefs and traditional practices in relation 
to the natural enviroimient (Coggins, 2003). Given these considerations, the extent of 
behavioral change required from State forest resource users and other potentially affected 
individuals is enormous clearly reducing the likelihood of altering the behavior and use 
of forest resources is in this context. 
Socio-political and Historical Context: 
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Hyde et al. (2003) have identified three cycles of forestry and land reforms since 
1978. According to them, increased decision-making authority at the local level, greater 
control over land and forest resources and less State control over the market economy 
characterizes each cycle. However, as inflation and other indicators determined as 
negative by the central government increase or become more prevalent, the policy 
advances and reforms are removed and replaced with centralized authority creating 
greater uncertainty at each stage (Liu, 2001; Hyde et al., 2003; Yamane, 2001). The 
impact of this atmosphere of uncertainty on forest management, especially in the 
southwestern management region, was mentioned in the background chapter. 
On the other hand, the authoritative nature of Chinese society has historically 
enhanced implementation of massive national projects. The Great Wall, the Three 
Gorges Dam and the Green Wall of China are some of the most obvious examples for the 
ability of a strong central govenmient to implement ambitious projects. In terms of 
implementing the NFPP and in pursuance of its lofty goals, an intervening and 
authoritative central government may or may not be good in terms of effective 
implementation or the achievement of desired outcomes. For example, a draconian 
approach to enforcing the logging ban may, in fact, eliminate commercial logging while 
simultaneously reducing subsistence forest and timber activities (Jintao et al., 2002). In 
my discussions with Jim Harkness, Director of the WWF in China in May 2004, he 
suggested that this is indeed the case. A stem central approach may also succeed in 
mobilizing a workforce capable of replanting the vast areas of denuded sloped 
agricultural lands in the nation's upper watersheds, though such an approach may not 
provide the necessary incentives required to ensure proper monitoring and survival rates 
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(Jintao et al., 2002). Precedent exists to support this possibility in the case of the Green 
Wall of China initiative (Steffen, A., 2003). 
Achieving the socio-economic goals of meeting wood product demands while 
reducing rural firewood dependency and diversifying the rural economy, however, may 
prove more difficult to achieve through purely authoritative pressure. As the rural 
southwest transforms from a timber-based economy to a more free market and tourism-
based economy, as NFPP proponents promote, the presence of an intervening strong 
central government may have unintended negative effects (Hyde et al., 2003, World 
Bank, 2003). Part of the central government's plan for diversifying the rural economy 
revolves around cultural and environmental tourism (Jintao et al., 2002). However, 
tourism-based economies may be expected to slowly evolve due to the inexperience of 
mountain-forest entrepreneurs with such ventures even if the central government 
institutes sweeping business management workshops (US Embassy—China, 2000). The 
other objective of this goal, reducing firewood dependency, though, seems to depend on a 
strong central government to provide cheap and dependable electricity through expensive 
and extensive rural electrification programs (Liu, J. et al., 2001). 
Given the historic context of wood production, forest cover and the xmcertainty of 
land tenure in the southwest forest management region, using an iron fist approach may 
be counter-productive to achieving NFPP goals (Liu, 2001). Liu (2001) draws several 
connections among tenure certainty, or security, non-state forest managers' trust in the 
State and the consequences for timber production. He claims that it is "the insecurity of 
land and tree tenure that affects incentives to plant new trees and manage existing 
resources sustainably" (Liu, 2001, p257). It is his assertion that "lack of tenure security, 
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rather than household management per se, has discouraged [non-state] farmers from 
managing timber forests as expected by the government" and that "a positive relationship 
between household management and forest cover where tenure is secure appears to exist" 
(Liu, 2001, p257). In other words, the more authority the central government exerts over 
timber and wood production by non-state managers, especially through the inconsistent 
application or implementation of policies governing land tenure and forest or tree 
management, the more likely or extensive a decrease in forest cover and wood product 
production among non-state forest enterprises. 
Furthermore, timber and wood product production from non-state forest 
enterprises has been steadily gaining on State enterprises in recent years (World Bank, 
2003). This is a trend that may reasonably be expected to accelerate in light of decreased 
production on State lands due to the logging ban. However, if the central government 
strongly intervenes in the operations of non-state forest enterprises, a promising avenue 
for meeting the nation's wood product needs through sustainable management of 
economically productive forest enterprises will most likely dissolve. The Hyde et al. 
studies of 2003 already provide some evidence to support this claim. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that the goal of meeting China's enormous and growing wood demand will be 
achieved through exertion of strong central authority over non-state forest enterprises and 
the inconsistent implementation of yet another forest policy (i.e.—^the NFPP) without 
heavy reliance on foreign imports (SAF, 2004). Additionally, it is unlikely that long-term 
watershed stability will be achieved through draconian measures. Even if large areas of 
the upper watersheds are reforested, survival rates may be reduced unless continued 
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monitoring and maintenance of the outplanted trees occurs either through the provision of 
sufficient incentives or the mobilization of forced labor groups (Steffen, 2003). 
Summary ofTractabilitv Impacts on Dependent Variables: 
The historic socio-economic and political context in which the NFPP is being 
implemented has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, a strong central 
government can mobilize its people to achieve large and ambitious projects more readily 
than less authoritarian governments. On the other hand, in relation to land tenure reform 
in China, an autocratic approach to increasing wood production, forest cover and 
establishing long-term watershed stability may not be the most effective way to attain 
some of the NFPP's main goals. The research and evidence provided by Liu (2001), the 
World Bank (2003), Hyde et al. (2003) and others regarding correlations between tenure 
uncertainty and decreases in forest cover or timber production on non-state forestlands, 
due to an inconsistent policy environment and inteqection of central government control, 
supports this assertion. Yet the goals of eliminating all timber harvesting in the nation's 
main watersheds, reforesting those watersheds—at least in the short-term, and reducing 
rural firewood dependency are actually suited to the advantages inherent in a strong 
central government. Restructuring the SFA, the timber industry and the forestry sector, 
including the re-deployment of its employees, is also a task more easily accomplished 
through authoritarian means. 
Millions of SFA employees must be retrained to perform tasks entirely different 
from their previous jobs. Tens of millions of non-state forest managers are required to 
alter the ways in which they conduct their business. The lives and livelihoods of 
hundreds of millions of other citizens are impacted by both or either the implementation 
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of the NFPP or its success in achieving the desired outcomes—^primarily reducing the 
frequency and severity of seasonal floods. Furthermore, each of the above stakeholders 
and target-groups not only vary greatly among themselves, but also across the many 
provinces where the NFPP is being implemented. This diversity is punctuated by 
differences between economic and educational strata, ethnicity, and means of livelihood 
(CEPF, 2002). Additionally, the extent of change required by the policy—essentially an 
entire restructuring of China's forestry sector, the reforestation of millions of hectares 
and the diversification and vitalization of the rural economy—^is immense. Each of these 
indicates that the size and diversity of the target-groups affected by the NFPP, as well as 
the extent of change proposed, is substantial thereby reducing the likelihood of successful 
policy implementation according to the modified Sabatier and Mazmanian framework. 
However, the Three Gorges Dam project is recent evidence of China's ability to relocate 
large numbers of people and to provide those transplants with accommodations and 
livelihood opportunities sufficient enough to quell social insurrections (Xinhua, March 
22,2004). The Green Wall of China project in the northern portion of the country is a 
strong demonstration of the central government's ability to achieve truly impressive 
results in reforestation and shelterbelt activities. The FAO estimates that over 1 million 
hectares per year are established in China primarily due to the Green Wall program and 
other State initiatives (FAO, February, 2005). 
The validity of the NFPP's guiding philosophy, that re-vegetating the denuded 
upper watersheds of the nation's major rivers will reduce the frequency and severity of 
floods and their collateral socio-economic costs, is not necessarily robust due to the 
increasing presence of urban infrastructure on potentially impacted floodplains. Also, 
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glaring contradictions exist among some of the main policy goals. Meeting the nation's 
growing wood demand is not consistent with drastic reductions in timber output— 
especially when the involvement of a strong central government in the management of 
non-state forests reduces forest cover and wood product output (Liu, 2001). The 
November, 2004 issue of The Forestry Source by the Society of American Foresters cite 
SFA statistics identifying a 41% decrease in timber harvest volumes from NFPP 
provinces between 1997 and 2003 while wood product imports increased 268% during 
the same timeframe (SAF, 2004). Furthermore, if non-state managed forest enterprises 
are unable to operate in a free-market economy and benefit from the fruits of their labor 
due to inconsistent and uncertain tenure and rights of usufruct, one of China's most 
dynamic rural economic sectors may falter thereby negatively altering rural socio­
economic conditions. 
In summary, aspects of each of the aforementioned independent variables both 
facilitate and detract from tractability of the problem (see Table 4.1). The availability of 
a validity technical theory regarding vegetation and hydrological flow is one supporting 
factor. The socio-political and historical context of China's strong central government 
and its ability to accomplish projects on a massive scale, despite large numbers of diverse 
peoples, is another. These conditions may lead one to predict successes in the NFPP's 
ability to produce the desired outcomes, namely the short-term objectives of stopping all 
timber harvesting in the target areas (i.e.—^the logging ban), restructuring the financial 
and managerial organization of the SFA, retraining SFA employees to perform new types 
of tasks, outplanting large areas of denuded lands in the sensitive watersheds, and 
reducing rural dependency on firewood for fuel. 
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Some aspects of these first few independent variables, however, actxially reduce 
tractability. A strong central government may be capable of implementing large-scale 
projects, however an authoritarian approach to regulating non-state forest enterprises in 
the Chinese context may actually reduce tractability of the problem. This is especially 
true in regard to some long-term goals of the NFPP such as the establishment of an 
effective forest protection and management system, the diversification of the rural 
economy and the ability to meet domestic wood demand. Therefore, given the above 
analysis, tractability of the problems addressed by the NFPP and its ability to produce the 
desired short-term outputs seems high, but tractability in the long-term sense of 
impacting the dependent variables in a way that produces desired outcomes appears low. 
Table 4.1: Assessing the Impact of Tractability Variables on Dependent Variables 
Desired 
Outcomes 
Availability of a Valid 
Technical Theory 
Target-group Size, 
Diversity and Extent of 
Change Required 
Socio-political and 
Historical Context 
Eliminate 
industrial 
logging 
+ Reduced logging slowing 
reductions in vegetative cover 
is a valid technical theory 
+ Industrial logging is 
easier to monitor than 
subsistence harvesting 
+ Strong central 
government 
- Long history of 
resource extraction 
Reduce rural use 
and dependency 
on firewood 
+ Increasing rural 
electrification leads to reduced 
firewood dependency is a valid 
technical theory 
+ The target-group is 
easily identifiable 
- Target-group is spread 
over vast areas 
+ Strong central 
government 
- Long tradition of 
firewood use for fuel 
Re-establish 
vegetation on 
sloped denuded 
lands in the 
short-term 
0 More vegetative cover 
leading to increases in 
watershed stability and reduced 
socio-economic costs may or 
may not be a valid technical 
theory 
- Enormous areas are 
targeted 
- Extent of re vegetation 
efforts required is 
massive 
+ Strong central 
government 
+ Proven experience in 
mobilizing resources for 
massive projects 
Permanently 
increase 
vegetative cover 
in the nation's 
main watersheds 
- Flood damage to urban areas 
may not be reduced simply by 
regulating hydrologic flow due 
to increases in population on 
potentially impacted 
floodplains 
- Enormous areas are 
targeted 
- Sustaining 
revegetation efforts 
indefinitely requires 
tremendous efforts and 
commitment 
- Strong central 
government 
- Intervention in non-
State forest operations 
- Historically one of the 
most impacted and 
denuded areas on earth 
Restructure the 
financial and 
managerial 
organization of 
the SFA 
0 Changes in SFA management 
will increase agency 
effectiveness may or may not a 
valid technical theory 
+ The SFA is a finite 
institution/agency 
0 The extent of change 
required is moderate 
+ Strong central 
government 
- Reduced capacity due 
to cultural revolution 
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Table 4.1 (continued): Assessing the Impact of Tractability Variables on Dependent 
Variables 
Desired 
Outcomes 
Availability of a Valid 
Technical Theory 
Target-group Size, 
Diversity and Extent of 
Change Required 
Socio-political and 
Historical Context 
Retrain SFA 
employees to 
perform new 
tasks 
+ The idea that training is 
necessary for SFA employees 
to transition from loggers to 
stewards is a valid theory 
- Large number of 
employees 
- Large diversity of 
individuals 
+ Strong central 
government 
- Reduced capacity due 
to cultural revolution 
Meet domestic 
wood demand 
- Meeting domestic wood 
demand while reducing timber 
harvests due to logging ban is 
not a valid technical theory 
- Domestic wood 
demand is enormous and 
skyrocketing 
- Government 
intervention in non-state 
enterprises reduces 
wood production 
Establish an 
ejfective forest 
protection and 
management 
system 
+ Recognition that a new 
approach to forest management 
is needed in order to stabilize 
sensitive watersheds is a valid 
technical theory 
0 Represents a complete 
reversal of previous 
forest management 
approaches 
- A large area and 
diversity of forests 
- Strong central 
government 
- History of 
ineffectiveness in 
managing protected 
areas 
Diversify and 
revitalize the 
rural economy 
+ Diversifying economies by 
developing non-natural 
resource-based industries is a 
valid technical theory 
0 Belief that revitalized rural 
economies will result from the 
logging ban despite traditional 
dependence on natural 
resources may or may not be a 
valid technical theory 
- Very large and diverse 
target-group 
- Large extent of change 
needed 
- Impacted areas 
historically operate on 
natural resource-based 
economies 
- Rural communities in 
affected areas are 
generally not included 
in China's recent 
industrialization 
Analysis of Statutory Variables 
Application of the modified framework for analyzing implementation of the 
NFPP also requires inspection of the role that statutory variables play in structuring the 
implementation process. According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), an understanding 
of program objectives on the part of the implementing agencies and their perceived locus 
of control or jurisdictional authority must be examined. This issue of jurisdictional 
authority is of particular importance in relation to the topic—especially given the history 
of forest management systems, tenure security and authoritative central control in China. 
The following analysis of statutory variables focuses on the aspects of the policy 
affecting the mobilization of resources necessary for instituting the desired behavior 
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change including clarity and specificity of the statutes, as well as the purpose and 
objectives to be pursued. 
Clarity and Consistency of Objectives: 
The NFPP policy goals are neither specific nor internally consistent—a common 
characteristic of Chinese policies (Harkness, 1998). Although Lu Wenming (1999) does 
cite explicit targets for reductions in logging quotas required by the NFPP, the zoning and 
definition of forest types is problematic in China and decreases the specificity of the 
policy's logging ban statute (see Rozelle et al., 2003). The development of an effective 
restoration and protective forest management system is underway, but it is seemingly 
incompatible with the goal to meet the nation's massive wood product demands. It may 
be possible to establish creative forest enterprises or to support existing ones that 
contribute to meeting China's growing demand for wood. However, it will take decades 
for such forest enterprises to approach the productivity lost to the logging of more 
productive primary timber stands due to the NFPP. Also complicating efforts to 
establish effective forest restoration and protection management systems is the fact that 
they are being developed in a context lacking a robust and valid data set for forestry 
systems in the target areas. 
Discrepancies between the different data published about China's 
forest cover illustrate the difficulty of reaching any firm conclusions about 
the forest conditions....therefore, it is difficult to infer anj^hing about 
changes in forest values from the official forest data (Hyde et al., 2003, 
pi 80). 
The above comment is made primarily due to the fact that definitions of forest 
cover have changed repeatedly over the years reducing consistency of cross-comparisons 
in data. 
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The clarity of policy objectives has traditionally plagued environmental 
management in China (Harkness, 1998; Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995). The NFPP is no 
different. There is no real ranked importance of the goals beyond the primary objective 
of halting all timber activities in demarcated areas. This is an apparent source of 
dissonance for policy implementation according to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) 
leading to a lower probability in achieving the desired outcomes. Due to the vagueness 
of the program, many State employees in national, provincial and local SFA departments 
do not fully understand the necessity or protocol for implementation (Jintao et al., 2002). 
The extension of the restricted use mandate to non-state forest farms, contrary to the 
expressed intentions of the central government, is evidence of serious misunderstandings 
already occurring due to the ambiguity of the policy (Jintao et al., 2002). The vagueness 
of policy statutes, according to the 2002 Task Force case studies, allows implementers at 
the local level to apply their own agendas and extend their jurisdictional authority over 
non-state forest enterprises. 
According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) and Sinkule and Ortolano (1995), a 
policy—its stated purpose, goals and desired outcomes, must be both clear and 
consistent. Clarity restricts independent interpretation among local level implementers 
ensuring a higher probability in attaining the vision sought by policy designers. 
Consistency is required in order to avoid incompatible and contradictory objectives. It 
has already been suggested that the goals of meeting the nation's wood demands and 
restructuring the rural economy are inconsistent and incompatible with the goal of 
eliminating timber production—a main source of both income for rural economies and 
wood products for the nation. 
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Progress towards meeting the wood demand is a quantitative matter that should be 
easily measvirable, while reducing rural firewood dependency directly correlates with the 
government's ability to provide cheap, reliable electricity in remote regions (Liu, 2001). 
It is the other goals, and the specific activities to be employed in achieving their 
outcomes, that are unclear. Specifically what forest types are off limits to logging and 
will the definition of those forest types continue to change in order to suit the particular 
needs of the State as they have in the past? How exactly is the financial and 
administrative structiire of the SFA going to be restructured to avoid the mismanagement 
that plagued the former MOP, especially once the focus of the agency is no longer 
consumed by the NFPP? What exactly will the one million plus SFA employees be 
retrained to do and what resources are available to accomplish that massive capacity 
building effort within a relevant timeframe? How will the reforested watersheds be 
monitored and maintained throughout the duration of the project and long after the food-
for-work incentives run out? Will revegetating the watersheds be enough to reduce 
flooding and socio-economic impacts? What constitutes an effective forest protection 
and management system? To what ends will the rural economy by diversified and how 
will such a substantial transformation be supported in the interim? Each of these 
questions illustrates the many shortcomings in the clarity of the NFPP suggesting a low 
probability in attaining the desired outcomes. 
Hierarchical Intesration and Decision-rules: 
The level of coordinated interagency action is another way the statute may 
structure implementation. "To the extent that the system is only loosely integrated, there 
will be considerable variation in the degree of behavioral compliance among 
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implementing officials and target-groups—as each responds to the incentive for 
modification within his local setting" (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, pi59). As noted, 
in the case of the NFPP, most of the actual implementation work takes place at the county 
level despite their very limited role in the decision-making process. 
Indeed, an important issue with regard to the program design is 
that decision-making power is increasingly diminished at lower levels of 
government, although lower level government forestry bureaus actually 
implement the program. In addition, because program funds are 
appropriated fi:om upper levels to lower levels of government, lower level 
governments generally lacked the leverage to complain about decisions 
made by higher levels (Ting in Jintao et al., 2002, p3). 
The NFPP requires that lower levels of government sign agreements with higher 
levels of government thereby accepting responsibility for implementation outputs (Jintao 
et al., 2002). Furthermore, according to the 2002 Task Force studies. State-owned 
agencies are only responsible for staff and requirements at their own level and are 
generally not responsible for people participating in the program at other levels. 
Township or county level agencies, therefore, often lack needed human, material and 
financial resources more available to agencies at the central or provincial levels. 
Although there is a high level of State control in China, as demonstrated by the 
drastic reduction in timber harvest levels post-NFPP (SFA, 2000), this is not to say that 
there is integration within and among the various State agencies and entities. Rather, the 
high level of State control in China is in contrast to the lack of sovereignty allowed in 
private organizations, not in the dominance of a central government organ over provincial 
and local government institutions. When conflicting directives from inter-govemmental 
superiors are received by subordinates, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) claim that the 
subordinates will ultimately lean toward the directives of the superiors who will most 
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affect its legal and financial resources over the longest period of time. This is an 
important aspect to consider since it sheds light on the postnring currently taking place 
among implementers of the NFPP (Jintao et al., 2002). Due to the vagueness and 
conflicting goals of the NFPP, local and provincial implementers are provided great 
latitude in interpreting and applying the mandated statutes. Combined with low 
hierarchical integration within and among State agencies, statute ambiguity results in 
increased opportunities for local implementers to bend the original intent of a policy for 
their own benefit. Specifically, this refers to the extension of the logging ban over non-
State forest enterprises by local level implementers for economic or political gain, as 
detailed in the 2002 CCICED Task Force case studies. 
Along those lines, Jintao et al. (2002, p66) recognize the distortion of incentives 
centered on the concept that the role of the State is to redistribute resources and exert 
direct control over land use regardless of ownership or rights of usufhict. "This concept 
not only contradicts existing law—as it pertains to private and collective landowners— 
but is out of step with modernization reforms in other sectors of the economy and the 
stated aspirations of the government" (Jintao et al., 2002, p66). It is this ingrained 
political philosophy that the central government should control all forms of land use, 
which is resulting in the extension of the logging ban to non-state forest enterprises. 
Although it is a belief held predominantly among the older, more conservative and 
traditional SFA cadres, it is still a powerful force even in reform-minded and progressive 
modem China. 
In light of the fact that there is little intra- and inter-agency hierarchical 
integration within the SFA and among other agencies participating in implementing the 
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NFPP, there is substantial and unnecessary replication of work and the wasting of limited 
scientific, material and economic resources (Richardson, 1990; Zhao Zhilong, March, 
2003). There is also considerable variation in implementation, compliance and 
accountability due to existing decision-rules that lay the burden of responsibility for 
achieving policy outputs at the local level despite their lack of involvement in designing 
the NFPP (Jintao et al., 2002). All of these factors combine to reduce the overall 
efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation necessarily diminishing the 
likelihood of achieving the desired outcomes. 
Financial Resources: 
To their credit, the central government is financially supporting the NFPP at a 
level unseen for forestry programs in China previously. The level of financial support 
suggests the relative importance of the policy among central decision-makers, however, it 
may still be insufficient given the massive scale and ambitious objectives of the NFPP. 
Furthermore, as noted in the policy design section, a small portion of the more than $300 
million US annual budget for the program has ended up at the local level where most of 
the implementation costs are incurred (Jintao et al, 2002). 
According to the 2002 Task Force report, the SFA also has the burden of 
supplying non-wage payments into pension, unemployment, health insurance, and 
housing funds for retired and released State workers. Each of these are not fiilly covered 
by State subsidies provided to ease the transition of the agency from a timber-based to a 
non-timber-based industry. In addition, many State forestry bvireaus maintain schools 
and hospitals for staff and their families. In Sichuan, payments into various benefit funds 
make up over 60% of the total staff compensation package (Jintao et al, 2002). After the 
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reductions in timber revenue from the NFPP, State-owned forest enterprises have no 
means of making the required payments. Program funding and subsidies only cover 
salaries of staff actively involved in forest tending and afforestation activities. Moreover, 
local level bureaus of the SFA may not be able to pay full staff salaries and other benefits 
in the future once State subsidies end (Jintao et al., 2002). Impacts on rural communities 
and local economies are substantial. 
The annual provision of $300 million USD combined with the savings in 
overhead that comes from a two-thirds reduction in the SFA workforce would seemingly 
increase the amovint of financial resources available to implement the NFPP. 
Additionally, enforcing the logging ban does not require any expensive technology or 
materials, just a sizable labor force—something readily available in China. However, 
retraining the remaining State employees will take significant time and money while 
simultaneously requiring substantial up-front financial outlays to cover the benefit 
packages promised to those who must be laid-off. Restructuring the financial and 
administrative functions of the SFA will also be a challenge, especially now that no new 
revenue is coming in from timber harvesting as it did in the past. From now on, 
substantial amounts of money will be required to establish an effective forest protection 
and management system and to reforest and maintain the vegetative cover within the 
nation's major watersheds. Most glaring, however, is the fact that restructuring the rural 
economy in the 18 provinces where the policy is being implemented will require massive 
financial investments which, according to the Task Force case studies, have yet to be 
allocated as promised by the NFPP. Without a strong commitment on behalf of the 
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central government, achieving the outcome of a revitalized and robust rural economy, not 
to mention re-vegetated watersheds, seems remote at best. 
Formal Access by Outsiders: 
According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), statutes may also affect the 
participation of actors external to the implementing agencies, namely two groups: 
potential stakeholders and the legislative, executive and judicial sovereigns. They also 
assert that, in cases where target-groups or individuals lack the ability to bear the cost of 
judicial review, statutes that allow for citizen participation "in the form of mandamus 
actions requiring agency officials to comply with statutory provisions" are more likely to 
attain the desired outcomes (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, pi61). 
Commimity participation, collaborative management and capacity building are 
approaches typically not considered in China. The formal access of stakeholders and 
outsiders to contribute and modify the NFPP is highly restricted. Neither local level SFA 
employees, nor non-state forest enterprises were consulted dviring the policy planning 
process. Furthermore, the rural people who stand to be most significantly impacted by 
implementation of the NFPP, in most cases, lack the ability to bear the costs of judicial 
review for challenging adverse actions of the implementing agency. Furthermore, 
judicial appeal in China is still a questionable venture. China is, traditionally, a non-
litigious nation. Most of the very limited nvimber of lawyers that do coimsel are trained 
primarily in business law (US Embassy-China, 2000). Additionally, many of the judges 
who may hear such a case challenging the authority of the State to exert control over land 
use may be conservative in nature. Similar to those local level implementers who are 
responsible for extending their authority over non-state forest enterprises, the 
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conservative judges may subscribe to the cultiiral belief that it is the duty of the central 
government to control the manner in which land is to be used. Although such a decision 
would contradict existing law and the expressed intention of the State, it is not a difficult 
scenario to imagine. 
There are, however, many progressive members in the various levels and 
branches of government. There is also a growing nvimber of domestic and international 
NGOs with increasing influence. Although most domestic NGOs, such as Green Rivers 
and Environmental Protection Volunteer Association of Sichuan, are environmental, not 
social, in nature, the two issues seem to converge when discussing the NFPP and may 
draw at least a modicimi of support. It seems more likely that more substantial support 
would come from international NGOs, such as World Watch Institute, Amnesty 
International, the World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace or others. The activities of all NGOs 
are typically under close scrutiny, though, and supporting contentious issues may 
negatively impact their organization (US Embassy-China, 2000). 
Multi-national institutions, such as the World Bank, the WTO or the IMF, have 
the most substantial leverage in influencing policy formation and adjustment in the 
current Chinese context. Inasmuch as China is currently in the initial stages of joining 
the WTO, they must comply with a wide range of standards and requirements. Several of 
these include the opening up and liberalization of the market economy and a legal system 
that recognizes private property and ownership (at least as it applies to corporations) and 
guarantees that those rights, if infiinged upon, will be upheld in Chinese courts (US-
China Business Council, 2005). Such standards may increase the possibility of judicial 
regress for stakeholders adversely affected by the NFPP. 
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One "outsider" group does currently have a direct and significant impact on the 
evolution of the NFPP and its implementation. The CCICED Western China Forest and 
Grasslands Task Force has extensively monitored the implementation of the NFPP to 
date. Their recommendations, based on numerous case studies, have reached the ear of 
Beijing. Reports in the People's Daily newspaper suggest that at least some of those 
recommendations are being considered by policy implementers thereby influencing 
implementation of the NFPP (Xinhua, November 25,2002). The inclusion of the 
international and interdisciplinary CCICED Task Force in providing assistance in the 
monitoring and evaluation of the NFPP is a promising sign that the formal access of 
outsiders may be increasing in the more liberal atmosphere of the reform era. 
Domestic and international environmental NGO's are relatively new in China and 
their influence is minor, though growing. Rural individuals or non-state enterprises 
generally lack the wherewithal to challenge legal transgressions—especially when the 
legitimacy of the courts is still in question. There is, therefore, little formal access for 
domestic outsiders to exercise citizen participation in the formation or modification of 
policies that directly impact their lives. According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), 
this necessarily reduces the likelihood of attaining the desired outcomes of a policy. The 
socio-political landscape in China is rapidly changing, however, both from within and 
without. Conservative cadres are being replaced with more progressive leaders, 
initiatives and legislation increasing individual rights are being passed, and the legitimacy 
of the covirts is slowly growing. These trends are supported and spurred on by China's 
emergence into multi-national trade groups requiring such standards suggesting that 
formal access by outsiders is increasing in China. 
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Summary of Statutory Variable Impacts on Dependent Variables: 
Virtually every aspect of each of the four statutory variables suggests that there is 
a low probability that the NFPP will attain the desired outcomes (see Table 4.2). The 
objectives are neither clear nor consistent. The hierarchical integration is loose and the 
decision-rules are not conducive to progressive and effective implementation. Financial 
resources are inadequate and there is very little formal access by those outside the 
implementing agency to alter the design and implementation of the policy. All of these 
conditions taken together, according to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), diminish the 
likelihood of policy success. This situation impacts policy outputs and the dependent 
variables in several significant ways. 
Implementation of the NFPP is changing local governments' revenue patterns 
and, therefore, their ability to provide both public and non-public goods, services or 
financial support. Although a subsidy is allocated to local level administrative units 
implementing the NFPP, it is insufficient to compensate for reductions in taxes and 
stumpage fees due to the program (Katsigris in Jintao et al., 2002). The World Bank 
(2003) reports that, in Sichuan as a whole in 1999, the total bank debt of provincial 
forestry units implementing the NFPP was 1.66 billion 5aian ($202.4 million US), of 
which 1 -4 billion yuan ($179.7 million US) was considered non re-payable. There are 9 
counties in Sichuan where the timber industry accounted for over 80% of the local 
government revenues (Katsigris in Jintao et al., 2002). According to Task Force case 
studies of 2002, now that revenues are dramatically reduced, roads are becoming 
neglected, schools and clinics are closing and financial institutions are suffering from 
high rates of loan defaults. 
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The cessation of logging removed an important source of cash revenue and 
economic opportunities for rural people despite their depth of association with the timber 
industry. Drastic changes in this one sector have had strong ramifications throughout all 
levels of China's rural and mountain-forest conmumities, society and economy (see 
Jintao et al., 2002; Li et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2003; and Rozelle et al., 2003). Timber-
processing facilities that formerly relied on both State and non-state forest timber 
activities are, predictably, drastically impacted. Not only do they now lack raw materials 
for processing, but aside from partial pension subsides, the NFPP neither offers the 
option to shift into a conservation role, nor does it provide unemployment benefits to 
non-state timber-processing enterprises (Jintao et al., 2002). Moreover, according to the 
Task Force case studies (2002), many new timber-processing facilities were recently 
established in less developed areas, making the situation even worse, given the debt 
incurred. They are now facing bankruptcy and foreclosure. 
With the implementation of the NFPP, community-level 
economies based on timber utilization from collective [non-state] forests 
have experienced severe economic setbacks in many of the natural forest 
regions of China and in some cases have even collapsed completely. The 
inclusion of collectively owned [non-state managed] natixral forests into 
the NFPP has caused a significant decline in economic output from 
community and household level forestry and related sectors (Katsigris in 
Jintao et al, 2002, p31). 
Also, subsistence livelihood activities in many communities, such as swidden 
agriculture, pasturing practices and the collection of non-timber forest products, are 
changing through limited access to land, timber and other forest products for self-use. 
"Extreme measures have cut off local communities' access to non-timber forest products 
as well as timber" (Ting in Jintao et al., 2002, p7). A significant proportion of the locals' 
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cash income is derived from manual labor in the forestry sector or through the industries 
which either directly or indirectly provide services catering to those associated with the 
timber industry (i.e. restaurants, hotels, gas stations, etc.). Although alternative 
livelihoods are emerging, they may not be strong enough or develop rapidly enough to 
mitigate the negative impacts. 
As the NFPP matures and the implementing agency adopts some of the CCICED 
Task Force recommendations, hierarchical integration may improve, more financial 
resources should begin filtering down to the local level and outsiders may gain some 
power to manipulate the policy's implementation, possibly even through legal channels. 
Many changes must occur, however, and it will take time to reverse traditional patterns of 
agency and ministerial isolation or non-cooperation and the culturally ingrained beliefs 
regarding the State and its authority over land use and tenure issues. It seems unlikely 
that legal challenges to that authority will take place within the life span of the NFPP 
imless pressed to do so by multi-national organizations as a requirement for China's 
participation in the WTO- It is also unclear whether the courts will interpret the 
established laws in favor of non-state users of land, or whether they will support the 
continuation of central authority over that resource. Some things are clear, however. In 
order to meet several of the proclaimed goals, especially the revitalization and 
diversification of the rural economy, substantially more financial support is required. 
Additionally, one of the most fundamental problems with the NFPP remains to be the 
ambiguity and inconsistency of policy goals. Due to its impact on tenure security and, 
hence, incentives for non-state forest enterprises to continue their important and valuable 
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work, this one element exerts a strong negative effect on the ability and possibility of the 
NFPP achieving what it has set out to do. 
Table 4.2: Assessing the Impact of Statutory Variables on Dependent Variables 
Desired 
Outcomes 
Clear and Consistent 
Objectives 
Hierarchical 
Integration and 
Decision-rules 
Financial 
Resources 
Formal Access 
by Outsiders 
Eliminate 
industrial 
logging 
+ The objective of halting 
industrial logging is 
consistent with the 
objective of slowing or 
reversing reductions in 
vegetative cover 
0 The objective of 
eliminating industrial 
logging may or may not 
be consistent with the 
objective of revitalizing 
the rural economy 
- Conflicting and 
ambiguous directives 
from superiors results 
in extension of the 
logging ban to non-state 
enterprises 
+ Significant 
financial inputs 
have been 
earmarked 
+ Restricting 
logging operations 
costs less than 
conducting them 
- Restricting 
logging operations 
reduces revenue for 
many stakeholders 
-Rural 
stakeholders have 
no representation 
in the formation 
and application of 
the logging ban 
+ Multi-national 
institutions are 
assisting in 
monitoring 
application of the 
logging ban 
Reduce rural 
use and 
dependency 
on firewood 
+ The objective of 
reducing rural fu*ewood 
dependency is consistent 
with the objective of 
reducing rates of loss in 
vegetative cover 
- Little or no integration 
between forest 
management agencies 
and those responsible 
for rural electrification 
programs 
-Rural 
electrification 
programs are 
expensive and take 
decades to realize 
- NGOs wishing 
to help reduce 
rural dependence 
on firewood are 
young and not yet 
very effective or 
influential 
Re-establish 
vegetation 
on sloped 
denuded 
lands in the 
short-term 
+ The objective of 
increasing vegetative 
cover in the short-term is 
consistent with the 
objective of increasing 
watershed stability 
- Little intra- and inter­
agency hierarchical 
integration in 
undertaking short-term 
activities 
- Revegetating 
millions of acres of 
steep, remote lands 
requires massive 
financial inputs 
- Food for work 
subsidies are 
lacking 
- Non-SFA 
groups that may 
be required to 
revegetate vast 
areas have been 
alienated from the 
planning process 
Permanently 
increase 
vegetative 
cover in the 
nation's 
main 
watersheds 
+ The objective of 
increasing vegetative 
cover in the long-term is 
consistent with the 
objective of increasing 
watershed stability 
- Little intra- and inter­
agency hierarchical 
integration in pursuing 
long-term goals 
- Monitoring and 
sustaining 
revegetation efforts 
on millions of acres 
of steep, remote 
lands requires 
massive financial 
inputs 
- Non-SFA 
groups that may 
be required to 
monitor and 
sustain 
revegetation 
efforts have been 
marginalized 
Restructure 
the financial 
and 
managerial 
organization 
of the SFA 
0 Changes in SFA 
management may or may 
not increase agency 
effectiveness in 
stabilizing watersheds 
- Objectives of the 
restructuring are not clear 
- Decision-making 
authority is diminished 
at lower levels where 
most implementation 
occurs 
0 Restructuring the 
SFA requires 
moderate amounts 
of time and money 
+ Multinational 
organizations, 
such as the World 
Bank and WTO, 
are assisting with 
the restructuring 
of State agencies 
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Table 4.2 (continued): Assessing the Impact of Statutory Variables on Dependent 
Variables 
Desired 
Outcomes 
Clear and Consistent 
Objectives 
Hierarchical 
Integration and 
Decision-rules 
Financial 
Resources 
Formal Access 
by Outsiders 
Retrain 
SFA 
employees 
to perform 
new tasks 
+ Training is necessary 
for SFA employees to 
transition from loggers 
to stewards and 
consistent with the 
goal of establishing an 
effective forest 
protection and 
management system 
- The source of 
technical expertise to 
conduct the training is 
unclear 
- Lower level 
government agencies 
lack needed human, 
material and technical 
resources more 
available to higher 
level agencies 
0 Retraining SFA 
staff and 
administrators 
requires moderate 
amounts of time 
and money 
0 Deficiencies in 
technical capacity 
due to the cultural 
revolution may 
require outside 
technical 
speciaUststo help 
retrain SFA 
employees 
Meet 
domestic 
wood 
demand 
- Objective of meeting 
domestic wood 
demand is seemingly 
incompatible with the 
logging ban 
-Lackof clarity 
regarding what forests, 
State vs. non-state, are 
subject to the logging 
ban results in reduced 
production from non-
state forest enterprises 
- Agencies and 
provincial SFA 
departments are loosely 
integrated and/or their 
dedication in the 
pursuit of meeting 
China's massive 
domestic demand for 
wood and wood 
products varies 
significantly 
- Reduced timber 
output, combined 
with increased 
wood demand, 
raises both price 
and spending on 
wood and wood 
product imports 
0 Non-state forest 
enterprises not 
affected by the 
NFPP continue 
contributing to 
meeting domestic 
wood demand 
0 Trade 
agreements are 
increasing wood 
imports 
Establish 
an 
effective 
forest 
protection 
and 
manage­
ment 
system 
- It is not clear what 
constitutes an 
"effective forest 
management system" 
0 Forest protection and 
forest management are 
conducted by two 
separate agencies: the 
State EPA and the SFA 
respectively 
- Forest protection 
is more expensive 
and less profitable 
than timber 
extraction 
0 Management and 
protection of 
China's remaining 
forests requires 
significant financial 
resources 
- NGOs wanting 
to help protect 
and manage 
forests are young 
and not yet very 
effective 
+ Multi-national 
institutions are 
assisting in efforts 
to protect and 
manage forests 
Diversify 
and 
revitalize 
the rural 
economy 
- A struggling 
transitional economy 
must result due to the 
logging ban before a 
diversified, sustainable 
economy emerges 
- Lack of clarity 
regarding what forests, 
State vs. non-state, are 
subject to the logging 
ban reduces incentives 
for non-state forest 
enterprises 
- Diversifying and 
revitalizing the rural 
economy requires a 
high level of intra- and 
inter agency 
coordination—a 
situation that does not 
currently exist 
- Revitalizing the 
rural economy 
requires massive 
subsidies in the 
short and long-term 
- NGOs that may 
wish to help 
diversify and 
revitalize the rural 
economy are 
young and not yet 
very influential 
+ Multi-national 
institutions are 
assisting in efforts 
to revitalize the 
rural economy 
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Analysis of Non-statutory Variables 
Each of the modified framework's non-statutory variables impacting NFPP 
implementation are considered in this section. The uniformity and severity of existing 
socio-economic conditions in the southwest forest region are explored. Existing land 
tenure and security in the region is also considered. The state and nature of media 
coverage regarding the NFPP is noted along with stakeholder resources, attitudes and 
organizational ability. Finally, the commitment and leadership skill of supporting 
implementing officials and sovereigns and the institutional capacity of the implementing 
agency is also analyzed. 
Socio-economic Conditions, Land Tenure and Attitudes of Constituency Groups: 
Socio-economic conditions for households and communities of State-owned 
forestry bureaus Eire generally better than those of communities that are predominately 
non-State supported (Jintao et al., 2002). However, negative changes in employment 
patterns attributed to the NFPP have been immense. As mentioned, an estimated 750,000 
to 1 million employees of State-owned forestry enterprises, out of about three million 
employees prior to implementation, have been dismissed (Jintao et al., 2002). "In a 
survey of 112 staff households at the bureau [local level SFA forestry unit], an average of 
94% of household incomes came from staff salaries, and about 85% of households 
depend exclusively on staff salaries for income" (Katsigris in Jintao et al., 2002, pi 6). 
Those sources of income are now truncated for over one-third of households in NFPP 
areas. At the same time, alternative work options are limited in many cases. Remote 
location, few transferable job skills, limited education and China's policies restricting 
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labor mobility may be expected to hinder a transition to alternative livelihoods or 
successful out-migration for work (Jintao et al., 2002). 
Poverty in rural mountain communities is substantial and often debilitating (Han, 
T., 2005). Some rural regions in China have among the lowest per capita incomes in the 
world. These communities depend heavily on subsistence activities and, formerly, 
indirect benefits from the timber industry (Winkler, 2004). In some places, local 
authorities take advantage of their authority by destroying bridges and erecting fences to 
restrict access to the collection of fuelwood or the operation of non-state forest 
enterprises then illegally levy fees for subsistence access (Jintao et al, 2002). 
Additionally, according to the 2002 Task Force studies, the few regional jobs available 
are usually allocated to former State employees leaving scarce employment opportunities 
for locals who are also ineligible to receive imemployment subsidies. Furthermore, 
former State employees not able to locate employment place increasing pressures on the 
non-state forest enterprises to provide work (Jintao et al., 2002). 
Each and every segment of the rural population in NFPP areas suffer from severe 
economic constraints (Han, T., 2005). According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), the 
severity and breadth of these negative and persisting socio-economic conditions, greatly 
reduces the possibility that the NFPP will be able to meet the goals established by the 
central government. 
Thus the more diverse an economy and the more prosperous the 
target-groups, the more probable the effective implementation of statutes 
imposing non-productive costs on them. The lower the diversity and 
prosperity, the more likely the substitution of subsidies for police power 
regulation (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, pi63). 
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Regarding the above quote, the NFPP affected areas are more in the latter 
condition rather than the former. Despite a long and peaceful tradition of non-
confrontation and respect for public order and government authority in China, individuals 
are increasingly faced with the choice to comply or survive even in the face of "the 
substitution of subsidies for police power regulation." The possibility of civil unrest 
increases as conditions deteriorate. Although such behavior is uncommon in Chinese 
society, there is precedent for the evolution of mass movements in dire circumstances. 
Unfortunately, the last such movement, a 1989 pro-democracy demonstration in 
Tiananmen Square, was dealt with in such a manner as to send a clear message to all who 
may try to place their individual agendas above that of the collective. In the context of 
the NFPP, subtle non-compliance through illegal forest utilization activities is the most 
likely scenario. After all, paying off or bribing local administrators if you are caught is a 
much more favorable situation than being involved with an uprising that may be 
ruthlessly crushed by the central government, especially an uprising located far away 
from the public eye. 
Many policies in the past have failed in China due to the level of control over 
resources, particularly land (Richardson, 1990). It was noted in the backgroimd and 
literature review section that Hyde et al. (2003), the World Bank (2003) and Liu (2001) 
have reported on the inconsistent and unpredictable nature of government policies in 
China that create an air of uncertainty regarding the management of forest resources. 
Furthermore, the authors assert that uncertainty, and the correlating decreases in trust 
toward the State, not only reduces incentives to sustainably manage forest resources, but 
that it has also been shown to lead to decreases in forest cover since new investments in 
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forestry practices are not undertaken. This is particularly true in China's southwestern 
forest management region where policies have historically been inconsistently applied 
(Liu, 2001; Yamane, 2001). 
Decentralization in decision-making power and rights of usufruct from the State 
to local communities has been a defining aspect of reform era policies in China since 
1980 (Hyde et al., 2003). The assumption, which has thus far been shown to be true, is 
that increased local control leads to greater and more sustainable forest management 
systems (Yamane, M., 2001; Yin, R., 2003; Wenming, L., 1999; Rozelle, S., Huang, J. 
and Benziger, V., 2003). Indeed, the non-state forest enterprises are exceedingly 
promising in their productivity and socio-economic potential for rural communities 
(World Bank, 2003). However, the nature of the NFPP's implementation may have 
lasting and far reaching detrimental effects on this encouraging component of China's 
forestry sector and may also negatively impact several policy outcomes. 
This extension of the NFPP to collective [non-state] forests has 
national level repercussions: production from these forests has been 
overtaking production from State-owned enterprises, and now constitutes 
at least 1/2 of all forest products supplied in the country. Impacts on rural 
households that previously had access to collectively owned forests raise a 
host of very critical issues with regard to sustainable management regimes 
and tenure (Jintao et al., 2002, p34). 
Currently, as revealed in the 2002 Task Force case studies, the attitudes of rural 
residents affected by the NFPP toward the policy are quite low. Without any substantial 
understanding of, or vested interest in the design, management and implementation of the 
NFPP, rural forest dwellers have little, if any, empathy for its mission. After all, it is not 
they that suffer from the flooding, yet it is they that must endure the brunt of the costs 
associated with its implementation. They must reforest the denuded, sloped agriculture 
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land in exchange for food subsidies, they must decrease their intake of wood for building 
material and fuel, and they must do so while their local economy is in a period of massive 
upheaval. Ultimately, and perhaps most ironically, several of the NFPP's goals have a 
significantly reduced chance of being realized by the existing understaffed and 
insufficiently supported SFA without collaboration with rural civilians. In other words, 
as long as rural mountain-forest dwellers are marginalized, as long as their security in the 
ownership of land and the fhiits of their labor are diminished, and as long as socio­
economic conditions continue to lag, successful implementation of the NFPP is 
necessarily impeded. 
The most obvious impact of the socio-economic conditions in NFPP areas has to 
do with the goal of diversifying the rural economy. Much more needs to be done in order 
for the NFPP to revitalize the rural economy from where it was before implementation of 
the NFPP to where the leaders in Beijing and rural residents would like to see it. Not 
only that, but what is being done needs to be changed significantly if this goal is to be 
realized. The current methods of implementation are, in fact, having impacts opposite of 
that which is intended (Jintao et al., 2002). This is true, in large part, due to the 
infringements being experienced by leasers of land. 
Furthermore, the willingness of individuals, collectives and communities to 
participate in a policy that is adversely affecting their livelihoods is low. The attitudes of 
constituency groups are simply not conducive to achieving the desired outcomes. 
Naturally, external pressures may attempt to coerce support for the policy and force 
participation in achieving its objectives. Such pressures may result in civil unrest or 
outward disobedience. Dissention is not completely absent in Chinese society. The 
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reform era has seen the development of greater resistance to the draconian measures of 
the central government more characteristic of the pre-reform era. As socio-economic 
conditions continue to deteriorate, the likelihood of resistance and the ability to organize 
opposition to the policy increases. The ability for such discontents to effectively attain 
their agendas, however, remains low. 
Commitment, Expertise. Leadership Skill and Resources of Implementins Officials 
and Support from Sovereisns: 
The modified analytic model emphasizes socio-economic conditions and land 
tenure given the Chinese context. Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), on the contrary, call 
the commitment and leadership skill of implementing officials the non-statutory variable 
most capable of directly affecting policy outputs by virtue of agency officials' 
commitment to the policy's purpose. 
This comprises at least two components; first, the direction and 
ranking of the statutory objectives in officials' preference orderings; and, 
second, their skill in realizing those preferences, that is, their ability to go 
beyond what could reasonably be expected in using the available 
resources. The importance of both attitudes and skill, of course, vanes 
with the amount of discretion afforded administrators (Sabatier and 
Mazmanian, 1980, pi66). 
The institutional capacity of those implementing the NFPP is quite significant in 
the Chinese context. Traditionally, many senior level SFA/MOF managers only 
considered the most efficient methods for harvesting trees (Richardson, 1990). 
Reforestation of denuded lands is a recent endeavor. To them, incentives for strong 
leadership performance have been related more to high production rates and financial 
returns rather than through a genuine interest and concern for the forest ecosystem under 
their management (Rozelle et al., 2003). Furthermore, due to China's historical and 
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existing system of job appointments and lack of labor mobility, many individuals are 
assigned positions in the environmental field without necessarily having any real interest 
or commitment to the ideals of environmentalism or natural resource conservation 
(Richardson, 1990). Yet, as revealed through discussions with Zhao Zhilong (2003), a 
Chief Vice Director in one of Sichuan's forestry bureaus and Li Shengzhi (2003), a 
Program Officer in Conservation International's China program, younger professionals 
are expressing more developed environmental values through a greater concern for, and 
interest in, environmental issues. They also see the potential of quick upward mobility as 
their superiors retire in the face of the restructuring—if they themselves are able to 
survive the cutbacks. Unfortunately, due to the lingering effects of the Cultural 
Revolution, many of these energetic young forestry professionals are ill equipped to face 
the challenges of reforming the entire industry along stewardship, non-extractive lines. 
Richardson (1990) notes that no fiill-length university course was completed in any field 
during the decade-long Cultural Revolution and since then all students receive diplomas 
regardless of their performance. Also according to Richardson (1990), there is little 
evidence of integrating resources among institutions and regions. The result is a general 
lack of managerial capacity, a shortage of qualified replacements and the wasting of 
scarce resources through non-cooperation and the duplication of efforts. 
Monitoring compliance is proving to be both difficult and costly (Rozelle et al., 
2003). The entire forest industry, primarily the production, trade and processing of forest 
products and the overall management of these activities in general, is undergoing drastic 
reforms (Hyde et al, 2003). Completely changing from the formally utilitarian, 
extractive, profit-driven industry into a more sustainable, eco-centric management 
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institution, practically overnight, requires a great deal of human, material and technical 
resources. Resources available to local level implementing officials, apart from their 
leadership skills and expertise, however, are limited. Not only must the greatly reduced 
and ill-trained workforce of the new SFA act as extension agents and advisors, they must 
also encourage non-state groups targeted by the sloping land conversion aspect of the 
NFPP to alter their behavior in favor of the government's goal of stabilizing the nation's 
upper watersheds (Jintao et al., 2002). According to the 2002 Task Force report, they 
have the leverage of food in exchange for the desired outcome. However, discussions 
with Zhao Zhilong, Chief Vice Director of Sichuan's Forestry Bureau in Dujinagyan in 
March 2003, suggest that the food surpluses predicted by the central government and 
earmarked for use in this program were not available. 
Additionally, local level implementers are manipulating the intentions and 
authority of the policy for their own benefit, as evidenced by restricting access and 
levying fees to utilize non-state lands, showing that there is a low level of commitment to 
achieving at least some of the desired outcomes (Katsigris, 2002). Implementers at the 
provincial level are more vested in the outcomes of the NFPP. Not only are they the ones 
that initially proposed the policy, at least the logging ban and revegetation efforts, but 
they are the ones that stand to loose the most if it fails and the flooding continues to 
worsen. Commitment at the national level is still in question. On the one hand, a 
substantial amount of money, by Chinese standards, was appropriated for the project. On 
the other hand, the national body that drafted the NFPP introduced several other goals, 
namely the socio-economic development schemes. Such initiatives require substantial 
inputs on their own. Their inclusion in the NFPP simply results in the draining of much 
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needed and limited funds from the activities more central to the original purpose and 
ultimate goals of the policy. 
Fundamentally restructuring an agency's purpose requires a great deal of 
commitment. This commitment must come not only from the individual implementers at 
the local, provincial and national level, but from the State as a whole as represented by 
the sovereigns in Beijing and the legislature. Will Beijing apply the recommendations of 
the CCICED Task Force and substantially modify the policy, especially as it pertains to 
the unintended effects on rights of usufruct and land tenure security? Are they willing to 
relinquish their traditional power and culturally supported authority over land use? Will 
they abandon the policy before its ten-year life span in favor of a different approach? 
What will the legislature do; support the continued exercising of decision-making control 
over land use and, hence, non-state forest enterprises, or will they uphold the current law 
and its mandate to decentralize decision-making control in this realm? These are 
important questions with very real ramifications. Inasmuch as the mid-term review was 
just completed, 2005 should be a very interesting year with respect to these questions and 
the future of the NFPP. 
Optimism prevails in the evaluation of this variable, however. Personal 
experience as a teacher of environmental science in China has shown a rapid and 
pervasive increase in environmental values and general knowledge of and concern for the 
nation's diminishing natural landscapes. The simple fact that Chinese environmental 
NGOs exist today when they were virtual non-existent twenty years ago is a very 
promising sign. True, new professionals entering the fledgling SFA may not have the 
advantage of multi-disciplinary ecosystem management classes that the west is able to 
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benefit fi-om—^most Chinese students that travel abroad for training are not foresters. But 
the conservative thinking, extraction oriented approaches of forest management senior 
professionals may spur new environmental managers to consider creative approaches and 
solutions to the complex problems facing the SFA and its implementation of the NFPP. 
It is undoubtedly a very exciting time to begin a forestry career in China. 
Although it may be too late for youthful exuberance, creativity and idealistic values to 
positively impact implementation of the NFPP, the lessons learned from such an 
ambitious project may prove invaluable to the development of skills and expertise in the 
new, reform-minded generation. The real test, as far as the imminent success or failure of 
NFPP implementation is concerned, lies with the support from sovereigns which is 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Media Attention to the Problem and Public Support: 
The state-controlled nature of media coverage in China is another non-statutory 
variable capable of altering the implementation process according to Sabatier and 
Mazmanian (1980) and the modified model. Although Sabatier and Mazmanian's 
western centered perspective does not translate well into the Chinese context in this 
respect, consideration of this variable is nonetheless revealing. Nearly all reports in the 
State media praise the successes of the NFPP in eliminating destructive logging practices 
while downplaying the negative socio-economic changes impacting rural peoples 
(People'sDaily, 10/25/01). This contributes to general public support for the program, 
especially among the urban dwellers affected by the 1998 floods, yet does little to 
convince many rural residents in mountain-forest regions of the program's benefits. 
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In fact, media attention to the NFPP is substantial. Comparable to the Three 
Gorges Dam project, most citizens in China are at least aware of "the logging ban." This 
is true due to pervasive application of the NFPP (in 18 out of 26 provinces) and the 
impact that reductions in timber output is having on the price of wood products and 
manufactured goods throughout the country (World Bank, 2003). However, the State-
controlled media is, by definition, substantially biased. Few of the negative impacts 
mentioned thus far are given much, if any, coverage in the nation's major sources of 
information. So although media attention to the problem is high, the objectivity of the 
information presented is questionable. 
Apart from the fact that the State media and a substantial number of urban 
residents strongly support the NFPP, most of the rural residents that feel a more direct 
and daily impact on their lives due to the policy understandably resent it (Jintao et al., 
2002). According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), the tenacity and voice of 
opposition groups is determined by membership and financial resources, their ability to 
comment on proposed decisions and the capacity of such groups to publish critical 
studies (of the NFPP). However, not only do impacted rural residents have little voice or 
tenacity, public opposition to centrally mandated policies is sensitive in China. Faced 
with this lack of a chaimel for dissent and the requirement to meet seemingly 
contradictory goals in the absence of adequate human, material or financial resources, 
support at the rural and local level is reduced. 
Although support for the NFPP in rural areas is low, the fact remains that a larger, 
more influential mass supports the program (People'sDaily, 10/25/01). Such media and 
public support, however, does not necessarily increase the likelihood of producing the 
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desires outcomes. Ostensibly, urban and media support is based primarily upon the 
outcome of reducing the frequency and severity of floods. There is little interest or 
knowledge in the socio-economic goals, the impact of the policy on rural livelihoods or 
in how the objective of flood control will actually be attained. They are, understandably, 
most concerned with their own livelihoods. It is the support from the rural residents, 
however, that is required if the ultimate goal of reducing flooding is to be achieved. 
Without their help, it will be exceedingly difficult to establish and maintain vegetative 
cover in the sensitive watersheds. Furthermore, such compliance cannot be maintained 
indefinitely through autocratic means. Due to this reason, the lack of support from rural 
residents necessarily reduces the chances for implementation success. 
Summary of Non-statutory Variable Impacts on Dependent Variables: 
The purpose of this analysis is to assess the effectiveness of the NFPP in 
producing the outcomes of eliminating destructive timber harvesting practices in targeted 
areas, of restructuring the SFA and of diversifying the rural economy while meeting 
domestic wood product needs. The impact of the NFPP on socio-economic conditions is 
more immediately noticeable in comparison to the other policy goals since the 
effectiveness in eliminating destructive timber practices requires time-consuming audits 
and surveys and successes in restructuring the SFA may be less obvious or require a 
longer period of time to realize. Also, the socio-economic objectives of the policy is, 
perhaps, more easily ascertained due to the availability of substantial data regarding this 
subject as a result of the Task Force case studies. According to those studies, crisis level 
poverty conditions in rural mountain-forest commimities unquestionably exist while 
traditional subsistence livelihoods are threatened. Furthermore, socio-economic 
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conditions in rural Sichuan and Yunnan are fragile and have historically been 
complicated by the extension of State authority over non-state forest management 
systems in the region (Jintao et al., 2002). The unemployment of almost a million people 
combined with China's policies restricting job mobility exasperates the existing 
problems. 
The biased perspective of the State-owned media and the non-existence of 
freedom of demonstration and expression by the general public or outsiders further 
finistrates the situation of rural constituency groups. Confounded by the lack of 
sufficiently trained senior management, possessing limited commitment to the long-term 
goals of the NFPP, and restricted in their management capacity due to the hiatus of the 
Cultural Revolution, implementing officials possess few incentives to excel in their 
assigned duties (Richardson, 1990). The result is a structure that more or less encourages 
local level implementers to extend their authority over non-state forest management 
systems in the name of the NFPP due to the possible benefits that may be accrued to 
them. Ultimately, although the logging ban itself enhances the short-term achievement of 
statutory objectives, under the current circumstances and given the evaluations of the 
non-statutory variables as a whole, the analysis suggests a reduced probability in 
achieving the desired long-term outputs. The impacts on dependent variables support 
these claims. 
According to the 2002 Task Force studies, negative trends in educational 
opportunities and social stability within rural communities is occurring. Education is 
traditionally highly valued in Chinese culture and a large proportion of household income 
is commonly devoted to education. Thus, declining incomes are negatively impacting 
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school enrollment (Jintao et al., 2002). As mentioned, many schools have already been 
forced to close as a result of economic impacts due to the logging ban. Additional 
evidence from the Task Force studies suggest that impacts on minorities, which make up 
the majority of populations in many of the mountain-forest areas covered by the logging 
ban, may be disproportionate in comparison to Han Chinese in the area primarily due to 
lower employment competitiveness. Given the potential for widespread employment 
difficulties, decreasing incomes and an increased school dropout rate, social stability in 
affected communities, both minority and non-minority, are at risk. Already, crime rates 
in many forest districts have increased (Katsigris in Jintao et al., 2002). 
These extreme negative changes in socio-economic conditions continue to impact 
perceptions about the importance of problems addressed by the policy. Faced with the 
development of crisis level poverty conditions and no option to transfer domiciles and 
employment, rural people have little empathy for the conservation of what scant 
vegetation remains in the watersheds. The maxim "conservation after breakfast" is 
universally relevant and, in the face of the rural divestiture occurring in exchange for 
urban development, mountain-forest communities in southwestern China are becoming 
increasingly anxious. Arbitrarily expanding the scope of the NFPP by imposing the 
logging ban on collectively owned forests has had serious implications for the livelihoods 
and perceptions of the involved communities. This has raised a host of legal questions 
and is incurring many social depravities as well. 
Indeed, this situation, and the corresponding erosion of trust due to the 
illegitimate extension of the NFPP's restricted-use mandate to non-state forests, may be 
the most significant negative impact resulting from the existing method of NFPP 
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implementation. The previously thriving non-state forest enterprises have been severely 
hampered in their ability to operate efficiently and in their ability to invest in diversifying 
their services given the unpredictable and uncertain tenure situation. 
Production capital and investments in production facilities could 
not be recovered or redirected to other areas [after the implementation of 
the NFPP]. This has particularly affected the township and village [non-
state] enterprises. At the same time, the total number of [non-state forest 
enterprises] decreased by nearly 65%...and employment declined about 
53% (Katsigris in Jintao et al., 2002, p33). 
In the past, forests were used as collateral, especially by non-state forest 
enterprises, to secure loans for needed agroforestry supplies (Richardson, 1990). Now, 
due to the insecure tenure issues related to extension of the NFPP and State authority 
over non-state forestlands, banks are hesitant to recognize the value of the forests and are 
withholding loans due to the uncertainty of ownership (Jintao et al., 2002). 
Apart from the alterations of trust dynamics occurring between State and non-
state constituencies, issues of compliance are also important to consider when analyzing 
implementation and ability to achieve desired outcomes. According to Sinkule and 
Ortolano (1995), compliance is a fimction of stakeholder and target-group values, 
attitudes, beliefs and behavior. Given the great and generally negative socio-economic 
impacts associated with implementation of the NFPP, how probable is compliance with 
the established statutes? We have only to look to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) for the 
answer. The analysts suggest that the decision to comply is a function of four factors: 
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1) The probability that noncompliance will be detected and successfully 
prosecuted. 
2) The presence of sanctions available to penalize noncompliance. 
3) The state of stakeholder and target-group attitudes concerning the 
fundamental legitimacy of the rules. 
4) The costs to stakeholders and target-groups of compliance with statutes. 
The primary provision of the NFPP is the logging ban. This provision is fairly 
straightforward despite its ubiquitous application. According to Jim Harkness (2004), 
Director of the WWF in China, the logging ban is strongly and effectively enforced, 
albeit, beyond its intended range. His testimony (2004) and personal experience in 
Sichuan (November, 2003) verify that industrial logging trucks are no longer plying the 
roads of western Sichuan. Large-scale timber harvesting in the region by the SFA 
appears to have ceased. However, Greenpeace China has recently uncovered evidence 
that Asia Pulp and Paper is conducting illegal timber operations in Yunnan Province 
(Xinhua, December 16). The SFA, upon becoming aware of the Greenpeace China 
accusations, immediately launched an investigation of the private timber corporation 
confirming the allegations. Chinese authorities are now suing APP for damages and are 
forcing compliance with the logging ban statute (Xinhua, January 17). 
At a more local level, compliance with the restricted-use mandate of the NFPP is 
currently begrudgingly accepted, albeit, circumvented whenever probability of detecting 
non-compliance is low (Harkness, 2004; Liu, J. et al., 2001). However, as socio­
economic conditions continue to decrease, non-compliance at the local and subsistence 
levels may reasonably be expected to increase proportionately. This is especially true 
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given the difficulty of the small SFA management teams to adequately supervise the 
extensive area of NFPP implementation (Zhao Zhilong, March, 2003). The corollary 
impact on vegetative cover due to non-compliance at the local level is currently unclear. 
The affect that implementation of the NFPP is having on formerly sustainable household 
level subsistence practices is also currently indeterminate. However, it has been 
suggested by some (Albers et al., 1998; Jintao et al., 2002; Hyde et al., 2003 ) that 
stakeholders are increasing pressure on and conversion of forest lands in the wake of 
massive and negative socio-economic impacts associated with implementation of the 
NFPP Meanwhile, compliance at the State and industrial level seems complete. Due to 
the scale of their operations, the easier to monitor industrial timber harvesters bare the 
majority of attention by the regulating police powers. Given these variable scales of 
compliance, the likelihood of achieving the main outcomes of increasing vegetative cover 
and stabilizing hydrological flow is uncertain. 
Table 4.3: Assessing the Impact of Non-statutory Variables on Dependent Variables 
Desired 
Outcomes 
Socio-economic Conditions, 
Land Tenure (certainty), 
and Attitudes of 
Constituency Groups 
Commitment, Expertise, 
Leadership Skill and Resources of 
Implementing Officials and 
Support from Sovereigns 
Media Attention 
to the Problem 
and Public 
Support 
Eliminate 
industrial 
logging 
+ Existence of a strong central 
government and a social 
tradition of obedience 
increases likelihood of 
compliance 
0 Conmiitment of senior SFA cadres 
to the logging ban is questionable 
+ Substantial resources have been 
dedicated to enforce the logging ban 
+ Strong support for the logging ban 
from the central government 
+ Media attention 
and support among 
urbanites is high 
- Support among 
rural residents is 
questionable at best 
Reduce rural 
use and 
dependency 
on firewood 
- Rural residents depend on 
wood for fiiel and will 
continue to utilize fuelwood 
until cheap, dependable 
electricity is supplied 
+ Rural electrification programs are 
supported by the central government 
- Resources for rural electrification 
programs are lacking or take 
significant time to mobilize 
0 Media attention 
and public support 
for this goal is 
neither significant 
or negative 
Re-establish 
vegetation 
on sloped 
denuded 
lands in the 
short-term 
+ Poor socio-economic 
conditions combined with 
financial and/or material 
subsidies help revegetation 
efforts 
- Food for work subsidies are 
not being provided as 
promised 
+ Sovereigns are committed to the 
goal of short-term revegetation 
0 Implementing officials may or may 
not be committed to the goal of 
short-term revegetation 
0 Expertise in watershed 
revegetation exists, but is limited 
0 Necessary resources exist, but may 
not be totally sufficient 
+ Media attention 
and urban support 
for this goal is high 
0 Rural support 
depends on 
availability of work 
or impact 
on/reductions in 
subsistence 
agricultural land 
area 
Permanently 
increase 
vegetative 
cover in the 
nation's 
main 
watersheds 
- As socio-economic 
conditions deteriorate and the 
ability to detect non­
compliance lowers, actual 
compliance with restricted use 
policies become more difficult 
to enforce 
0 The support of sovereigns and 
commitment implementing officials 
to the goal of long-term watershed 
revegetation is still in question 
0 Availability of necessary resources 
and leadership skill required to 
sustain long-term watershed 
revegetation is questionable 
+ Media attention 
and urban support 
for this goal is high 
0 Rural support 
depends on 
availability of work 
or impact 
on/reductions in 
subsistence 
agricultural land 
area 
Restructure 
the financial 
and 
managerial 
organization 
of the SFA 
0 Sweeping changes may or 
may not be resisted by 
affected constituency groups 
- Cultural tradition of 
"guanxi," or favoritism in 
business and employment 
- Lack of sufficiently trained senior 
managers due to the hiatus of the 
cultural revolution 
- Few incentives for managers to 
excel in their duties 
0 Support and resources for making 
the transition are moderate 
0 Media attention 
to this goal is not 
substantial, nor is it 
absent 
0 Public support 
for this goal is 
neutral 
Retrain SFA 
employees to 
perform new 
tasks 
0 Huge numbers of 
employees require training 
0 Employees may or may not 
resist a new employment role 
- Lack of experienced trainers 
0 Commitment to the new role of the 
SFA, on behalf of implementing 
officials and sovereigns alike, is 
questionable 
0 Media attention 
is not substantial, 
nor is it absent 
0 Public support is 
neutral 
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Table 4.3 (continued): Assessing the Impact of Non-statutory Variables on 
Dependent Variables 
Desired 
Outcomes 
Socio-economic Conditions, 
Land Tenure (certainty), and 
Attitudes of Constituency 
Groups 
Commitment, Expertise, 
Leadership Skill and Resources 
of Implementing Officials and 
Support from Sovereigns 
Media 
Attention to 
the Problem 
and Public 
Support 
Meet 
domestic 
wood 
demand 
- Incentives to engage in forest 
enterprise activities are reduced 
due to State control over land 
regardless of ownership or rights 
of usufruct 
0 Commitment, expertise, 
leadership skill, resources and 
ability to attain this goal are all 
questionable 
0 Support from sovereigns, 
prim-arily injudicial decisions 
regarding rights of usufruct for 
non-state forest enterprises in a 
position to contribute to meeting 
domestic wood demand, is not yet 
known 
0 Media 
attention and 
urban support is 
not substantial, 
nor is it absent 
0 Rural support 
depends on 
ability to benefit 
from forest 
enterprise 
activities 
Establish an 
effective 
forest 
protection 
and manage­
ment system 
- Incentives to reorganize or 
establish a new forest management 
system are distorted in favor of the 
concept that the role of the State is 
to redistribute resources and exert 
direct control over land regardless 
of ownership or rights of usufruct 
- Existence of a poor, subsistence 
and natural resource-based 
economy reduces likelihood of 
compliance with restricted use (of 
forest resources) mandates 
0 Commitment, expertise, 
leadership skill, resources and 
ability to attain this goal are all 
questionable 
- Recent studies (Liu et al. 2001 
and Lu et al., 2002) suggest China 
is not very successful in 
effectively establishing and 
managing protected areas and/or 
forest ecosystems 
+ Media 
attention and 
support among 
urbanites is high 
0 Support 
among rural 
residents 
depends on the 
impact resource 
management 
has on their 
lifestyle 
Diversify 
and 
revitalize the 
rural 
economy 
- Existence of a poor, subsistence 
and natural resource-based 
economy 
- Job mobility is restricted 
- Over 1 million former SFA 
employees are unemployed 
- Negative trends in education and 
investment reduce business 
potential 
0 Commitment, expertise and 
leadership skill toward meeting 
this goal are all questionable 
- The massive amount of 
resources required to meet this 
goal are not available 
- The basic ability to reasonably 
attain the goal, given the existing 
scale and context, is doubtftil 
+ Media 
attention toward 
this goal is 
significant and 
public support 
is high 
Summarizing the Impacts of Independent Variables on Policy Outcomes 
The design and implementation of the NFPP has unquestionably altered socio­
economic conditions in the targeted areas (Jintao et al., 2002; Winkler, 1998). However, 
due to the current lack of a robust data set or capacity to monitor policy outputs, the 
nature and extent of those changes and their impact on forests and forest management 
systems in southwestern China cannot be definitively known at this time (Rozelle et al., 
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2003). What is currently known includes quantifiable information regarding changes in 
social and economic conditions throughout the reform era and implementation of the 
NFPP to date, as well as changes in forest ecosystems according to State forestry 
statistics up to the last forest inventory in 1998.''' 
Several researchers have identified interrelationships between changing socio­
economic conditions and changes in forest cover and forest management systems within 
reform era Chinese (Rozelle et al., 2003) and southwestern forest management region 
contexts (Li, 2000; Lu et al., 2002; Liu et al., 2003). Their research, the Task Force 
findings and case study evidence regarding socio-economic and environmental changes 
resulting from the method of NFPP implementation reveals several forces influencing a 
number of dependent variables impacting forest management systems in southwestern 
China. The strength of trust and tenure arrangements among stakeholders and the level 
of decision-making authority, particularly the level of non-state enterprise self-
determination, are two main driving forces given the context. Operational capacity—of 
the SFA to implement the NFPP, of local govenmients to provide matching funds for the 
project while losing revenue because of it, of essential community services (schools, 
clinics, roads, utilities) and enterprises to operate and of local household ability to 
subsist—is another key factor. Related to capacity, employment, and hence, livelihoods 
are additional socio-economic variables impacting policy outcomes especially given the 
large gap left by the extinction of the timber-based economy. Changes in environmental 
values among the various stakeholder and target-groups, and the logging ban itself, round 
See Appendix 2: Forest Resource Statistics in China. 
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out the most fundamental variables affecting policy outcomes, China's southwestern 
forests, and the organizations responsible for their management. 
"The impacts of the Natural Forest Protection Program at the local level are 
immense" (Katsigris in Jintao et al, 2002, plO). Virtually every aspect of life in the 
region is impacted: schools are closing, local governments are unable to provide 
necessary public services, traditional livelihoods are struggling to persist, and the 
availability of capital for the development of new businesses or industries is evaporating 
(Jintao et al., 2002). A significant reduction of income for many rural residents is one of 
the most serious socio-economic impacts occurring as a result of the program, according 
to the 2002 Task Force studies. Communities in prefectures where the timber industry 
was previously dominant suffer disproportionately since they do not receive any 
compensation under the current plan and community access to forest resources has been 
substantially and illegally reduced (Jintao et al., 2002). Non-state forest management 
enterprises in the region, in addition to subsistence livelihoods, have also been 
permanently altered due to actions restricting access to non-state forest farms (Rozelle et 
al., 2003; Liu, 2001). This situation is effectively strangling what had been, up to the late 
1990s, one of the most promising fi-ee-market industries in southwestem China. 
The extension of the NFPP beyond SFA employees and administrators, due in 
large part to the vagueness of policy statutes is a truly unfortunate situation, especially 
given the existing and tenuous historical context. The misappropriation of legally 
established tenure arrangements and decision-making authority resulting from the way in 
which the NFPP has been implemented may have irreversibly altered value and trust 
dynamics between private citizens and the State. These negatively shifting attitudes may 
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likewise force changes in cultural resource use-patterns (i.e. subsistence agroforestry 
livelihoods) thereby endangering fragile cultures and ecosystems alike (CEPF, 2002). 
Without tenure security, there is little incentive to manage forests sustainably for future 
returns. If the SFA is already understaffed and relying on disgruntled private citizens to 
assist with the restoration of the nation's watersheds, it is unlikely that the agency will be 
able to successfully attain the key goal of the NFPP—^watershed stability. 
The NFPP has unquestionably reformed the financial and organizational 
operations of the SFA and the timber industry through reorganization of the labor pool 
and the redirection of industry focus (Jintao et al., 2002). The SFA is no longer able to 
continue along the lines of its predecessor, the Ministry of Forestry, in the ceaseless 
extraction and highgrading of some of the world's last, great biodiverse temperate forests. 
Although goals for reforestation activities have been set and oversight committees are in 
place, a redefinition and rezoning of the remaining forests is still a contentious issue 
(Rozelle et al., 2003). Concixrrently, internal conflicts of interest, such as the posturing 
taking place among head administrators of NFPP management centers attempting to 
direct State funds along nepotistic lines, threaten the legitimacy of monitoring agencies 
(Katsigris in Jintao et al., 2002). 
Fundamentally, though, the NFPP signals a significant change in values and 
attitudes towards forests among all involved with or affected by the policy. Whereas 
local government institutions see the protection of forests as a means of pandering to 
State and central powers, personal experience shows that the more educated and 
privileged members of Chinese society, as represented by academia and its highest levels 
of leadership (i.e. central government cadres), are beginning to value the nation's forests 
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for other functions besides timber production (i.e. watershed stability). Additionally, the 
cultural values of minorities and rural households with respect to forests are rapidly 
changing. In the past, religious and social norms regulated natural resource use patterns 
in remote rural communities (Coggins, 2003). Now, resource consumption in general 
and the number of households are increasing while out-migration of the most educated 
and skilled youth is expected to occur (Liu, J. et al., 2001). Possibly even more 
significant, trust among locals toward the government has been substantially reduced due 
to the nature of the NFPP's implementation (Jintao et al., 2002). Conflict and reduced 
collaboration among the major stakeholders is already increasing (Katsgiris, 2002). 
The actual and perceived outputs of the NFPP, like the policy outputs of the 
implementing agency, have been demonstrated to be, for the most part, negative. 
Essentially, due to the fact that the non-statutory independent variables are categorically 
and unfavorably impacted by the nature of the NFPP's implementation, many rural 
residents are attaching negative connotations to the policy (Jintao et al., 2002). The 
logging ban has clearly fundamentally and permanently altered the forest industry and a 
number of associated industries thereby altering employment and revenue opportunities 
in rural communities to varying degrees. Budgetary changes as a result of the program, 
are constraining the ability of local level governments and economic institutions to 
provide essential social and financial services (Jintao et al., 2002). Also, access to and 
control over forest resources has been substantially reduced causing a host of other 
problems. Most significantly, value and trust perceptions have been, perhaps irrevocably, 
impacted due to the policy outputs and associations with land tenure and socio-economic 
conditions. Due to these conditions and perceptions, there is a low chance that the NFPP 
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will successfully produce the desired outputs of long-term revegetation of the nation's 
major watersheds, restructuring the SFA, meeting domestic wood demand, reducing rural 
dependence on fuelwood and restructuring the rural economy—all with the ultimate 
outcome of watershed stability. 
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Chapter 6 
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
How should, or will, China address the aforementioned conditions and 
shortcomings of the NFPP? What alterations in the implementation of the NFPP are 
needed to increase the likelihood of attaining the desired outcomes? Ideally, the futvire of 
forestry in China would be able to meet each and all of the ambitious NFPP goals. 
Protection of the remaining forests would be established, reforestation and rehabilitation 
of denuded lands would occurred, the SFA would transform into an ecosystem 
management institution with intrinsic environmental values, and the nation's growing 
wood product needs would be met while improving the livelihoods of rural people. Yet, 
as has been shown, several of the NFPP's goals are neither realistic nor intemally 
consistent. So what options are available to modify the NFPP and increase its likelihood 
of success? Any reasonable options for altering the NFPP and the future of forest policy 
in China must bear in mind the nation's historical context, the way that past policies have 
impacted forests and their management, and the existing socio-economic conditions of 
the region. Furthermore, those options must pass the litmus test of the modified 
framework if they are to be successful. 
One option is to simply dissolve the NFPP or not enforce policy mandates. 
Livelihoods would gradually return to a timber and non-timber forest product-based 
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economy with decreases in forest cover occurring at pre-ban rates. Virtually all 
forestlands in the region could reasonably be expected to transform into commercial 
plantations, agriculture and grazing plots, poor quality secondary forest and/or denuded 
wasteland. The timber-based economy riding that wave to the end would then be forced 
to undergo essentially the same transformation brought on by the NFPP (and perhaps 
without central government and State assistance). This option only prolongs the 
inevitable. 
The above scenario makes it clear that the SFA must change from an industry 
based on timber extraction to an institution of forest stewardship. After all, the NFPP 
was established for very real and practical reasons. More frequent flooding combined 
with development in major floodplains is placing hundreds of millions of people and 
large tracts of property at risk—^not to mention what's left of the world's most biodiverse 
temperate forests and China's ethnic minorities, which are inextricably linked to them. Is 
a complete ban on logging, though, necessary given the large socio-economic 
ramifications? Are sustainable approaches or innovations in harvesting methods a viable 
alternative as the 2002 Task Force report seems to indicate? 
A sustainable harvesting scheme would clearly not only lessen 
negative impacts on forestry enterprises, but also lessen many of the 
negative economic impacts on other stakeholders. Some managers in 
western Sichuan, for example, have suggested various types of selective 
logging schemes for their enterprises, mentioning issues of overmature 
forest and windfallen trees. Because of interference from grazing, the 
latter do not play the role they potentially could in regeneration. Thus, the 
ban on collecting them should be reconsidered (Jintao et al., 2002). 
See Appendix 2: Forest Resource Statistics in China. 
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Given the current context of limited institutional capacity to invest in innovative 
harvesting methods and the pension to vaguely define the parameters of sustainable yield, 
anything short of the existing absolute total ban on logging leaves the remaining primary 
forests in a vulnerable state. The question is, in what cases and to what extent should that 
restriction be applied? 
One solution may be to simply continue implementing the NFPP as it has been 
thus far. However, as was shown through application of the modified model, the policy 
as it is currently being implemented may reasonably be expected to fail—or worse. 
Extending restrictions on management of forests to non-state enterprises previously 
guaranteed rights of usufruct and not compensated for losses incurred due to the NFPP 
will most certainly continue to have negative consequences. Non-state forest enterprises 
could be forced out of business and corrupt authorities pandering to conservative State 
cadres may continue to demand illegitimate levies from locals in exchange for access to 
forest lands for subsistence needs. Enterprise and household economic viability declines 
reducing employment opportunities, household incomes, and operational capacity while 
simultaneously and significantly decreasing trust and tenure security. 
In this scenario, one may expect direct and indirect socio-economic pressures 
related to subsistence livelihoods to increase forest conversion to some degree while the 
enforced ban may reduce conversion of natural forests and possibly increase development 
of other (secondary) forest types. The balance between those pressures, the types of 
forests they impact and the extent of changes incurred in the various types of forest 
management systems are currently indeterminate at best. This option—^the no action or 
status quo alternative is, therefore, also undesirable. 
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Another option may be to scrap the NFPP altogether in favor of an entirely new 
approach. This option leaves open the flexibility of planners to address the shortcomings 
identified in the preceding analysis including elimination of the more socio-economic 
developmental goals of poverty alleviation and rural electrification. Although this option 
has merit, it could compound the problems of the current situation. In the best possible 
scenario for this option, all current shortcomings of NFPP implementation would be 
tackled and resolved including clarification of goals and intentions, sufficient funding 
whether or not the socio-economic goals are retained and the inclusion of various 
stakeholders and target-group constituencies in a collaborative planning process. At 
worst, the central government could assume an autocratic position employing draconian 
measures such as extreme authoritarian or police presence, forced labor or a complete 
redistribution of land and forest resources to suit its needs. After all, precedent exists to 
support the plausibility of such a scenario—and not so long ago. More likely, a new 
approach to solving the same problem of watershed stability would not be nearly so 
drastic, nor would it be so inclusive. Whatever the outcome of scrapping the current 
policy in favor of a new one would be, the result is the same in either case—^uncertainty. 
And, as mentioned, vmcertainty in the Chinese context, especially as it relates to the 
management of forest resources, only results in less incentive to invest in the sustainable 
management of trees and forests. Consequently, forest cover and vegetation in the 
nation's major watersheds decrease thereby reducing the likelihood of ever producing the 
primary outcome that the current policy seeks to produce—^watershed stability. 
Whereas the Task Force recommends removing restrictions on non-state forest 
enterprises throughout the 18 provinces in which the NFPP is currently applied, it may 
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not be the best option for Sichuan and Yunnan provinces if reductions in forest cover are 
to be avoided. As noted in the background and findings sections, due to the complicated 
tenure-trust arrangement present in the southwestern forest management region, return of 
management authority over forestlands to the non-state forest management systems may 
actually result in accelerated rates of conversion (of forestlands to harvested and denuded 
"wastelands"). This response may be expected given the strong possibility that managers 
may seek to preempt possible future withdrawal of access rights to those lands by the 
State once they have regained what will most likely be perceived as temporary access to 
forest resources (see Rozelle et al, 2003). 
Preliminary information suggests decreasing trends in percent and volume of 
natural forests in the southwestern region are occurring within both State and non-state 
managed forests (World Bank, 2003; Harkness, 2004; Critical Ecosystem Partnership 
Fund, 2002). Arguably, this may suggest that management type, whether administrated 
by State or non-state entities, has essentially been a non-factor with respect to changes in 
primary forests in the region. "A relatively constant land area under forest cover, 
however, does not mean that reform policies, management practices, and other economic 
forces have not affected the resource" (Rozelle et al., 2003, pi 15). Sayer and Sun (2003), 
on the other hand, suggest that "political reasons instead of economic development 
(commercial logging) have been the primary source of the loss of natural forests." 
Implementation of the NFPP is none-the-less undoubtedly changing relationships 
between forests, their management, the people that depend on them and the polices that 
govern each. The extent to which this is occurring and the nature of that relationship 
warrants continued consideration, explanation and critical evaluation. The relationship 
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between vegetative cover, hydrologic flow, the frequency of floods and the severity of 
their socio-economic impacts likewise merits further consideration. 
Under the present southwestern forest management system, and according to 
existing information regarding the significant negative relationship between forest cover 
and the erosion of trust within this context, decreases in the area's forest cover, even in 
some more remote natural forests, may be expected (Hyde et al., 2003). Additionally, as 
previously mentioned, reductions in trust have been shown to reduce incentives for non-
state forest management systems (World Bank, 2003; Hyde et al., 2003; Jintao et al., 
2002). Operational capacity and employment opportunities, especially among the non-
state entities, may be expected to worsen before eventually transforming the anticipated 
subsistence based livelihoods of locals into a more sustainable market economy based on 
the most adaptable non-state forest enterprises (Jintao et al., 2002). 
Is the above option, then, when applied to the modified analytical framework, 
capable of increasing the chances of success for the NFPP? The answer is yes, but not 
dramatically. Both tenure certainty and socio-economic conditions may or may not 
increase as a result of this option, but there is no doubt that it will increase, even if ever 
so slightly, the possibility of realizing the desired outcomes in comparison to the other 
options previously mentioned. However, consider the possibility of adding the provision 
of issuing compensation for the illegitimate extension of the NFPP's restricted use 
mandate to non-state forest enterprises. Better yet, what if this illegal transgression is 
challenged in China's rapidly developing legal system? This would most likely increase 
tenure security if rural people have faith in the reforming judicial system to protect their 
rights. Such conditions not only improve tenure certainty and trust dynamics, but also 
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help to address the critical socio-economic impacts currently resulting from 
implementation of the NFPP through financial infusions to rural households and 
communities who were operating thriving forest enterprises prior to establishment of the 
policy. Despite relinquishing control over the non-state forest enterprises and the large 
outlay of cash required by this option, it may be the only avenue left to the State if many 
goals of the NFPP are to have a reasonable chance of being attained. The only other 
ways to increase policy success is to simply redefine it through elimination of one or 
more of the goals—^namely, the developmental goal of improving rural people's socio­
economic conditions, or to reverse the current trend of development in the fioodplains 
which is placing many people and much property at great risk. 
Asserting the Recommendations 
It seems China has reached the point of no return, so to speak, with regard to 
implementation of the NFPP in the southwest forest management region. The question 
remains "where to go from here?" The solution appears to revolve around three tenuous 
points: 1) decision-meiking authority, 2) rights of usufruct, and 3) compensation for lands 
reapportioned by the State due to the policy. These three issues taken together form the 
trust relationship between non-state forest enterprises and the State thereby determining 
tenure certainty and security. Therefore, if the logging ban over primary forests on State 
lands continues to be well enforced, as we have seen indeed it should, then a return of 
decision-making authority and rights of usufruct to non-state forest management systems 
should increase the likelihood of success for the NFPP. However, the damage has been 
done, more or less, to relationships of trust among the various stakeholders in general and 
between the non-state forest management systems and the State specifically. 
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The primary recommendation for modifying the NFPP pertains to rights of 
usufinct and tenure security under the non-state system. "Denying these communities the 
right to benefit fi-om their investments in their forests not only contradicts existing 
legislation but compounds tenure insecurity and diminishes incentives to invest in forest 
restoration and management" (Jintao et al., 2002, p63). Removing all restrictions from 
the non-state forest management systems, save logging in primary and threatened or 
biologically diverse natural forests, is a key aspect of the NFPP requiring alteration. It is 
virtually universally recognized in the literature (Liu, 2001; Liu et al., 2003; World Bank, 
2003; Hyde et al., 2003; Richardson, 1990; Rozelle et al., 2003) that increased tenure 
security and recognition of property rights (of usufixict), backed by a stronger judiciary 
legal system, will greatly increase incentives to sustainably manage forest resources 
among non-state forest enterprises throughout China. Hyde et al.(2003), and the World 
Bank (2003) note that continuing the decentralization of State-owned enterprises, 
allowing them to self adjust in preparation for the downsizing and reduced industry 
subsidies that comes with membership in the WTO, will increase sector efficiency. 
The vagueness of NFPP statutes has allowed for great latitude in their 
interpretation on behalf of implementers at various levels. Subsequently, actual and 
perceived outputs have significantly and negatively altered stakeholder-implementer 
value-trust dynamics and socio-economic conditions. Most significantly, according to 
the World Bank (2003) and many others, is the need to reduce policy uncertainty and 
strengthen incentives. A coherent sfrategy that makes necessary transitions while 
balancing and considering socio-economic needs should be pursued. The devolution of 
decision-making authority to a more local level, inasmuch as decisions are in line with 
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State objectives to protect forest ecosystems, are two more considerations put forth by 
Hyde et al. (2003) and Lu Wenming (1999). 
In addition to increasing tenure certainty and security, improving overall capacity 
within China's forestry sector is flmdamental to the issue of efficiently and effectively 
managing the nation's forests. The issue of poorly trained replacements must be met with 
stronger support for training programs focusing more on ecosystem and watershed 
management approaches rather than in the production-extraction model indicative of the 
old Ministry of Forestry. Increasing the capacity to conduct high quality research 
activities and addressing the growing wood crisis through additional communal 
reforestation activities is also recommended by the World Bank (2003). 
Improvements in policy design, implementation and analysis 
depends on improvements in capacity. Capacity building at all levels of 
government agencies and research institutions should be given high 
attention. Building up strong and independent research institutions seems 
to be particularly important currently in China (Jintao et al., 2002, p73). 
The demonstrated lack of capacity on behalf of the SFA to meet each or all of the 
NFPP goals must also be more clearly recognized and acknowledged. To begin with, 
removing socio-economic development responsibilities from the SFA agenda would free 
up a great deal of hvmian, material smd financial resources allowing for greater focus on 
ecosystem management issues. The continued decentralization of timber related 
enterprises from State-owned to non-state managed enterprises and the devolution of 
decision-making authority over larger tracts of secondary forests will further assist the 
SFA by reducing the scope and scale of its responsibilities. This not only helps direct 
more resources to the NFPP's policy sub-component and sister project, the Sloping Land 
Conversion Program, but it will help guide and clarify the restructuring process. 
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Additionally, a more rigorous monitoring and assessment of ecological tradeoffs 
must be developed together with an appropriate transition to a more effective forest 
management strategy once the NFPP is phased out. Jintao et al. (2002) note that one of 
the NFPP's main problems is its lack of an effective monitoring and evaluation system. 
Current monitoring and evaluation focuses on compliance with the logging ban only and 
does not consider policy outcomes such as its administrative and socio-economic goals. 
This is only one of many areas where the NFPP may need improvement. The logging 
ban assumes that strongly enforced and homogeneously applied restrictions on any type 
of forest harvesting in sensitive areas will increase forest ecosystem and watershed 
functions thereby reducing damages related to flooding. More research is needed to 
verify this causal theory within the evolving context of NFPP implementation and by 
recognizing that life and property is at greater risk now due to urban expansion and 
development in flood-prone areas, not necessarily due to an increase in the frequency and 
severity of floods themselves. Accordingly, the World Bank (2003) recommends that 
more information on relations between key indicators and variables be collected in an 
effort to identify specific relationships between socio-economic forces and changes in 
both State and non-state forest management systems and in forest cover within the 
Yangtze River watershed. Furthermore, greater financial support for affected forest 
communities is also required to ease the transition into alternative non-timber based 
market economies. This includes extending State subsidies to local governments and 
mimicipalities in order to maintain essential public services and reducing SFA budgetary 
pressures at the same time. 
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Complimentary to the above recommendation is the need to develop a more 
robust and detailed interdisciplinary data set. Ideally, the collection of this data set would 
not only assist government and non-governmental decision-makers by virtue of providing 
qualitative and quantitative information of a higher validity than that which currently 
exists, but it would also directly improve the capacity of the SFA in conducting field 
surveys. Inter-organizational, interdisciplinary and inter-stakeholder communication 
could be developed while improving SFA employee moral, participation and levels of 
trust helping to positively shift environmental values and awareness among the interested 
parties and the general public. 
In summary, there is a great deal of latitude available for improving the NFPP 
specifically and China's forestry sector in general. Issues pertaining to rights of usufruct, 
tenure security and decision-making authority among non-state systems are clearly the 
most salient with respect to forest management systems in the region. However, issues of 
institutional capacity are also of great concern given the recent socio-economic and 
political history of China. Related to this, the absence of a robust and valid data set 
regarding a number of key variables in the system is a significant deficiency that needs to 
be addressed. Maintaining or increasing current financial support for the transition fi^om 
a timber-based economy to a more diversified market-based economy is iterated by 
many—especially the World Bank. They also emphasize removing existing legal and 
economic barriers to the efficient operation of the nation's forestry sector in light of 
China's imminent induction into the WTO. Further improvements in the process and 
participation in developing future environmental policies is another notable 
recommendation despite the vmlikelihood of its imminent acceptance. Even if each of the 
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aforementioned recommendations are applied, some difficult questions remain. To what 
ends should forestry in China be directed? What are the most pressing issues of concern? 
Furthermore, who are the beneficiaries, what stakeholders should be involved in future 
decisions about forest policies in the region and who decides the answers to these 
questions? These dilemmas are not unique to China and the world may leam a great deal 
from the way in which the Chinese address these issues within their own rapidly 
developing, hyper-dynamic, high-population context. 
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Chapter 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze implementation of the Natural Forest 
Protection Plan in China's southwestern forest management region and to assess the 
effectiveness of the policy in producing the desired outputs and outcome. 
Implementation of the NFPP began in 1998 primarily in response to a series of 
devastating floods that occurred early in the year. The central government blamed these 
floods on a lack of vegetative cover in the nation's major watersheds. The primary 
outcome of the ten-year program is to be less severe and frequent flooding by virtue of 
more stabilized watersheds and hydrological flow patterns. The desired policy outputs 
anticipated to produce this outcome include the short and long-term revegetation of 
China's major watersheds and a total ban on industrial logging in 18 provinces. The 
NFPP seeks to produce other outputs as well. These include the administrative 
restructuring of the State Forest Administration, the retraining of its workforce, an 
increase in its effectiveness as a forest protection agency and its ability to meet the 
nation's growing wood product needs while reducing rural fuelwood dependence and 
revitalizing the rural economy. 
The policy, as it is implemented in China's southwest forest management region, 
is embroiled in a complex socio-economic and political-historical context that greatly 
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impacts the abihty to produce the desired outcome and outputs. China's history of 
communal ownership of land and unpredictable changes in poUcies regulating forest 
resources and rights of usufruct has produced an air of uncertainty, especially among 
forest resource managers in the southwestern provinces. Such uncertainty has led to less 
investment in sustainable forest management, higher rates of land conversion and lower 
levels of vegetative cover than the central government desires. Until recently the non-
state forest management system has been held up as a model of successful reforms on 
behalf of the State. Their achievements served as an example for the smooth 
transformation of an industrial sector formerly heavily controlled by the State to a sector 
successfully operating in the emerging free market economy. Although the State is 
seeking to stabilize the policy environment, the nature of NFPP implementation to date 
has only increased the level of uncertainty among non-state forest enterprises primarily 
due to increases in State control over these non-state entities. 
The central goverrmient maintains that the restricted use mandate regarding 
timber harvesting as established by NFPP statutes is directed at the SPA and State lands 
only. Although the SFA is the intended target-group of the NFPP, numerous interested 
stakeholders are emerging as implementation progresses. These stakeholders and the 
target-group represent a substantial portion of the nation's populace and are comprised of 
diverse socio-economic sub-groups with a wide range of perceptions and levels of 
influence over NFPP implementation. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) conceptual framework of the implementation 
process was modified to accommodate China's unique context and applied in order to 
analyze the impact of a variety of factors on NFPP implementation and its ability to 
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produce the desired outputs. Although the Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) framework is 
intended to be utilized as an analytic tool that reviews a given policy's implementation 
from start to finish, the modified Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) framework was applied 
in order to determine effectiveness of implementation halfway through the NFPP's 
lifespan. Each aspect of the independent variables—^tractability, statute and non-statute 
variables affecting implementation and their impact on the dependent variables of 
compliance and outputs—^were compiled, examined and evaluated utilizing information 
extracted from personal interactions and experiences, numerous case studies and 
additional reports from experts on the matter. Clarke and McCool's (1996) 3-part ordinal 
scale was also applied indicating whether a variable enhanced, detracted or contributed 
equivalently to implementation and its effectiveness in producing the desired outputs. 
The findings show that socio-economic conditions in rural areas are currently 
negatively impacted by implementation of the NFPP while impacts on forests and forest 
management systems in southwest China are indeterminate at this time. The presence of 
a strong central government is favorable for producing the output of short-term 
revegetation of the nation's watersheds while it is less capable of producing the output of 
long-term increases in vegetative cover. Also, as a result of the nature of NFPP 
implementation, uncertainty among non-state forest enterprises regarding the tenure of 
trees over which rights of usufruct had previously been granted is increasing while the 
capacity of local institutions to provide necessary community services is decreasing. 
Compliance with the logging ban statute is near complete among State target-
groups while compliance among subsistence stakeholders and some private enterprises is 
lower due to a reduced risk of detection as a result of an understaffed agency. Although 
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the technical theory under which policy implementers are operating is valid and would 
result in the desired outcome of watershed stability if all outputs are produced, the size, 
diversity and extent of change required is enormous, agency integration is low, there is 
little access by outsiders and the commitment of sovereigns is still questionable. There 
are variations both in the central level design for different provinces and in the way in 
which the provinces have developed their own implementation schemes. Also, the 
reasons for the provincially imposed absolute logging ban are not fully understood even 
within the implementing agencies. Primarily, the disregard of community rights is a 
fundamental flaw with the current implementation of the NFPP due to the fact that the 
decision-makers, implementers and overseers do not include many potentially impacted 
stakeholders. Also, even though the media and urbanites support the policy, rural 
residents are less supportive as food for work subsidies diminish and as socio-economic 
conditions deteriorate. All of these factors necessarily reduce the likelihood of the NFPP 
to achieve the desired outcome according to Sabatier and Mazmanian. 
The findings fiirther reveal that the restructuring of the SFA into an effective 
forest management agency while meeting domestic wood demands despite the logging 
ban is neither consistent nor a valid technical theory. The size and extent of change 
required to transform the SFA is substantial while the specifics of the restructuring 
remain unclear. Appropriations slowed by the complex, multi-level planning and 
approval process, management problems, confusion and disagreement over the program's 
objectives, insufficient funds and staff, and a general lack of collaboration and 
institutional capacity to successfully pursue the program's goals further impede effective 
implementation of the NFPP. Although recent precedent exists in China supporting the 
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government's ability to successfully overhaul ineffective agencies, there is a lack of 
experienced professionals in the fields of ecosystem management and watershed 
restoration to assist in the shift. 
Shortcomings are also evident in the NFPP's ability to produce the desired 
outputs of a revitalized rural economy and a reduction in rural fuelwood consumption. 
Around 1 million former SFA employees are now unemployed as a result of the NFPP 
causing substantial and negative impacts on local economies. Investment in new 
enterprises and education are decreasing thereby increasing subsistence-based livelihood 
activities. Conversion of land to agricultural use and the collection of fuelwood are two 
such activities increasing in prevalence and in their impact on vegetative cover. 
Commitment of leaders and sovereigns to revitalizing the rural economy is questionable 
due to the insufficient funding for training and new enterprises during the necessary 
transition period. Virtually all of the conditions revealed in the findings necessarily 
reduce the ability of the NFPP to produce the desired outcome and outputs according to 
the modified firamework for analyzing policy implementation in China. 
Several options exist for modifying NFPP implementation; two of those options 
may increase its effectiveness in producing the desired outputs while the others do not. 
Dissolving the policy altogether, with or without attempting to establish a new policy 
approach aimed at achieving the same outcome, only increases uncertainty thereby 
reducing investment in forest enterprises capable of increasing vegetative cover. Altering 
the complete ban on logging in favor of a sustainable yield approach also perpetuates 
perceptions of an insecure policy environment among natural resource managers fiirther 
reducing the likelihood of achieving long-term increases in vegetative cover. The options 
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that may increase policy effectiveness include eliminating the socio-economic objectives 
and reducing or removing government control over non-state forest enterprises. 
Removing all restrictions from non-state forest enterprises, save destructive 
activities in primary and threatened or diverse areas, is an essential modification for 
improving the effectiveness of NFPP implementation. Challenging the illegal extension 
of State control over non-state entities guaranteed rights of usufruct and suing for 
compensation within the nation's maturing legal system is another key recommendation. 
Each of these actions, when backed by a stronger judicial system, may increase 
confidence in State policies thereby encouraging investment in the development of non-
state forest enterprises capable of assisting NFPP implementers in achieving many of the 
desired outputs. Clarifying the objectives of the administrative restructuring of the SFA 
is also important, while increasing training, capacity and interagency coordination is 
another main recommendation for improving the SFA, and hence, NFPP implementation. 
Finally, the development of a rigorous monitoring program backed by a robust data set of 
key variables is fundamental to continual modification and improvement of the NFPP as 
a policy and in its ability to produce the desired outputs. All of these recommendations 
taken together necessarily enhance the ability of the NFPP to achieve a primary outcome 
of more vegetative cover in the major watersheds, however, a reduction in the frequency 
and severity of floods and their socio-economic impacts may not necessarily follow as 
policy plaimers assume. 
China's Natural Forest Protection Plan was established for very real and 
significant reasons. Rapid conversion of one of the world's last, great biodiverse 
temperate forests combined with massive development on the nation's perennial 
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floodplains is increasingly threatening millions of lives. Application of the modified 
framework for analyzing policy implementation in China reveled that the NFPP, 
inasmuch as it is cxirrently being implemented, will unlikely reverse this trend or rates of 
conversion. Producing the desired outcome of stabilized watersheds and less socio­
economic impacts is, therefore, also unlikely. Achieving the outputs is complicated by a 
great many factors, yet there are many options available to policy implementers for 
altering the NFPP and increasing the probability of realizing its more central goals. 
Although the challenges for achieving the desired outcome are large and 
seemingly insurmountable, in the end, optimism must persist. China has a long history of 
attaining ambitious, seemingly impossible goals. With the right leadership, resources and 
commitment, they can do so again—including large-scale watershed restoration. The 
biggest hurdles now are socio-economic and political. If these can be overcome, the 
technical aspects of sustaining long-term revegetation efforts will follow in suite. If so, 
like the phoenix of Chinese mythology rising out of the mire and ashes of history, a 
model may spontaneously develop out of the initial failures of the NFPP spurring 
innovations tailored to China's unique context and the complex environmental challenges 
contained within. Following in the Chinese tradition, the venerable sage Lao Tzu 
provides guidance and inspiration in our journey to transcend the complexities of modem 
ecosystem management which now parts from this dialogue and continues on its Way to 
a more harmonious interaction with the environment: 
Nature is like a bellows. 
Empty, yet never ceasing its supply. 
The more it moves, the more it yields; 
So the sage draws upon experience 
And cannot be exhausted. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Major Forest Policies of the Reform Era 
Table A: Major Forest Policies of the Reform Era 
Year Policy Issued by Principal objectives 
1981 Decisions on 
Several Issues 
Related to Forest 
protection and 
Development 
Central 
Committee 
and State 
the Council 
Sets rules for forest protection and 
development. For forestry reform: determines 
the ownership of forests, designates areas for 
household use, defines forestry responsibility 
system. 
1985 The First Basic 
Forest Law 
People's 
Congress 
Formally recognizes the division of land 
between the State and collectives, sets forest 
management objectives, establishes timber 
harvest quotas and requires shipping permits. 
1986 Implementation 
Rules for the 
Forest Law of 
China 
State 
Council 
Implements the forest law, protects forest 
resources and develops the forest industry. 
1987 Enhancement of 
Forest Resource 
Management 
Central 
Committee 
Halts ruinous cutting, implements the 
responsibility system of government leadership 
at all levels in the protection and development 
of forest resources. 
1988 The Provisional 
Regulation of 
State-owned 
Enterprise 
Management 
Responsible 
Contracting 
System 
State 
Council 
Improves control over the consumption of 
forest resources and improves the financial 
operation of State-owned forests. SOEs 
required to adhere to timber quotas, promote 
reforestation, diversify management of 
resources, enhance productivity, forest 
protection and fire prevention. 
1995 Notice on 
Implementing the 
System of Using 
Forest Lands with 
Certificates 
MOF Requires certificates for the management of all 
forestlands differentiating them from other 
land uses. Restricts the conversion to other 
land uses ensuring that the land is regulated 
according to the Forest Law. 
1995 General Outline 
for Restructuring 
the Forestry 
Economic System 
MOF Pushes forest enterprises toward the market, 
mobilizes financial support to forestry through 
tax policy, strengthens infi-astructure 
development, reduces the role of government 
& reinforces administrative support for forestry 
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1995 Instructions on 
the Decision 
about 
Accelerating 
Progress 
MOF Reforms science, technology and education in 
forestry and establishes them as the guiding 
ideology for promoting forest development as 
the major mission for the near future 
1996 Reform of the 
Classified 
Management of 
Forestry 
MOF Classifies forests according to commercial, 
environmental (public interest) and mixed-
objectives 
1996 Decision on 
Several Issues 
Related to 
Deepening the 
Reform in the 
State-owned 
Forest Farms 
MOF Emphasizes 2 points: 1) classified management 
reform must differentiate between commercial 
and environmental forests and should be 
appropriate for local economic and social 
development conditions and 2) industry 
structure of forestry farms must be optimized 
1998 National 
Ecological 
Environmental 
Establishment 
Program 
State 
Council 
Continues the shift toward environmental 
justifications for State forest management 
1998 Amended 
Forestry Law of 
the PRC 
People's 
Congress 
Legalizes transfer of family plots and extends 
the period of user rights, essentially stabilizing 
forest tenure in collective forests; emphasizes 
that the primary role of forestry is to provide 
environmental services. 
1998 Protecting Forest 
Resources, 
Interdicting 
Ruinous 
Deforestation and 
Occupation of 
Forest Land 
State 
Coimcil 
Protects forest resources by preventing the 
conversion of forestland for agriculture and 
other development purposes 
1998 Natural Forest 
Protection Plan 
State 
Covincil 
Bans logging in primary forests in the upper 
reaches of the Yellow and Yangtze River 
watersheds, reduces timber production of 
State-owned forest farms in the northeast and 
inner Mongolia by 19.91 million m , 
establishes 12.7 million ha of plantations and 
redirects/resettles over 740, 000 excess 
workers. 
1999 Sloping Land 
Conversion 
Program 
State 
Coimcil 
Converts steep-sloped marginal cropland to 
forests and grassland and seeks to reduce rural 
poverty through these efforts. 
Adapted directly from Zhang and Chen in Hyde et al. (2003) and SFA (1999,2001). 
117 
APPENDIX 2 
National and Regional Forestry Statistics for China 
The Tables on pages 119-122 are taken directly from Rozelle et al., 2003 (pages 
110, 117, 119, 120 and 120) in Hyde et al., 2003. They in turn draw their information 
from China's National Forest Resource Statistics published in 1983, 1989 and 1994. The 
Tables on page 123 are taken directly from Yamane (2001) and also uses data published 
by the National Forest Resource Statistics. The bar graph on page 124 illustrates the 
sharp increase in China's forest product imports since the establishment of the NFPP. It 
is taken directly from a Society of American Foresters article entitled "China's Appetite 
for Timber Grows" in the November 2004 issue of The Forestry Source. 
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Table 6-1. Forest Cover and Standing Forest Volume, Late 1970s to Early 1990s 
Reg/on 
Forest cover Standing forest volume 
% % Change Million 
\ 
% Change 
1980 1988 1993 1980-1988 1988-1993 1980 1988 1993 1980-1988 1988-1993 
Northeast State Forest Region 
Heilongjiang 33.6 34.4 35.6 2.2 3.5 14.4 13.2 13.5 -8.3 2.3 
Nei Monggol 11.9 11.9 12.1 0.3 1.7 8.5 8.6 9.0 2.0 3.7 
jilin 32.2 33.0 33.6 2.5 1.9 6.6 7.1 7.6 8.1 6.8 
Subtotal 19.5 19.8 20.3 1.6 2.5 29.4 28.9 30.0 -1.7 3.8 
Southern Collective Forest Region 
Fujian 37.0 41.2 50.6 11.3 22.9 3.0 2.6 3.2 -11.0 21.9 
Jiangxi 32.8 35.9 40.4 9.6 12.3 2.4 1.7 1.8 -28.7 7.3 
Hunan 32.5 31.9 32.8 -1.9 2.9 1.6 1.4 1.5 -12.2 17 
Guangdong" 111 27.0 35.9 -2.4 32.8 2.0 1.9 2.2 -8.7 18.1 
Guangxi 22.0 22.0 25.3 0.0 15.2 2.2 2.0 2.1 -7.5 4.7 
Subtotal 29.4 30.2 35.2 2.8 16.5 11.2 9.6 10.9 -13.8 12.9 
Southwest Mixed-Management Region 
Yunnan 24.0 24.4 24.6 1.6 0.8 11.0 11.0 II.O -0.0 0.8 
Sichuan 12.0 19.2 20.4 60.1 6.0 10.5 12.7 13.0 214 2.5 
Subtotal 16.9 21.3 22.1 26.2 3.6 215 23.7 24.1 10.4 1,7 
North Central Fast-Growth Region 
Jiangsu 3.2 3.8 4.0 17.5 6.9 0.03 0.07 0.08 113.1 18.2 
Anhui 13.0 16.4 16.3 25.8 -0.2 0.55 0.71 0.63 30.9 -12.5 
Shandong 5.9 10.5 10.7 77.8 2.0 0.05 0.11 0.15 118.3 42.1 
Henan 8.5 9.4 10.5 10.7 11.6 0.32 0.40 0.48 26.8 19.2 
Subtotal 7.9 10.4 10.8 30.9 4.1 0.95 1.29 1.34 36.8 3.5 
All China 12.0 13.0 13.9 8.2 7.2 79.8 80.9 90.9 1.4 12.3 
Total covered area (million ha) 115.3 124.7 133.7 
' Noles: Forest cover h total forest area divided by total land area. The years 1980, 1988, and 1993 are approximate dates of China's second, third, and fourth forest surveys. (The 
first survey occurred before reforms began in 1978 and is irrelevant to our analysis. The second was conducted in different provinces between 1978 and 1981, the third was 
conducted between 1986 and 1989, and the fourth was conducted between 1992 and 1994.) 
"Hainan is included with Guangdong. 
Sources: National Forest Resource Statistics 1983, 1989, 1994. 
Table 6-3. Shelterbelts: Area and Volume for Selected Regions, Late 1970s to Early 1990s 
Area Volume 
Million ha 9( > Qiange Million % Change 
Region 1980 1988 1993 1980-1988 1988-1993 1980 1988 1993 1980-1988 1988-1993 
Northeast State Forest Region 
Heilongjiang 0.47 0.45 0.40 -6 -10 0.42 0.29 0.28 -32 -3 
Nei Monggol 0.28 0.40 0.50 43 26 0.12 0.21 0.23 76 8 
Jilin 0.89 0.82 0.75 -8 -8 0.70 0.63 0.79 -10 26 
Subtotal 1.64 1.66 1.65 1 0 1.24 1.13 1.30 -9 15 
Southern Collective Forest Region 
Fujian 0.14 0.22 0.31 60 39 0.09 0.12 0.22 41 78 
Jiangxi 0.05 0.19 0.26 276 33 0.04 0.05 0.07 27 35 
Hunan 0.04 0.16 0.20 258 22 0.02 0.09 0.10 307 17 
Guangdong" 0.17 0.25 0.36 46 43 0.08 0.16 0.20 92 24 
Guangxi 0.59 0.67 . 0.86 14 29 0.46 0.47 0.57 1 22 
Subtotal 0.99 1.50 1.98 50 32 0.70 0.89 1.17 28 30 
Southwest Mixed-Management Region 
Yunnan 0.54 1.60 1.80 198 12 0.97 2.33 2.57 140 10 
Sichuan 2.03 3.38 111 67 -20 2.68 5.30 5.37 97 1 
Subtotal 2.57 4.98 4.52 94 -9 3.65 7.63 7.94 109 4 
North Central Fast-Growth Region 
Jiangsu 0.03 , 0.06 0.07 115 13 0.01 0.02 0.03 222 23 
Anhui 0.03 0.39 0.12 1,450 -70 0.00 0.19 0.04 4,581 -80 
Shandong 0.47 0.47 0.44 1 -7 0.03 0.05 0.07 52 50 
Henan 0.28 0.34 0.31 23 -8 0.13 0.15 0.16 15 11 
i Subtotal 0.80 1.27 0.94 59 -26 0.17 41 0.30 138 -26 
lAII China 
1  ̂ 10.00 14.56 16.07 46 10 8.84 14.00 17.78 58 27 
Notes: The years 1980, 1988, and 1993 are approximate for the three forest survey periods. 
"Hainan is included with Guangdong. 
Sources: National Forest Resource Statistics 1983, 1989, 1994. 
Table 6-4. Area in "Economic" Forest, Late 1970s to Early 1990s 
Region 
Commercial tree crops Orchards 
Million ha % Change Million ha % > Change 
1980 1988 1993 1980-1988 1988-1993 1980 1988 1993 1980-1988 1988-1993 
Northeast State Forest Region 
Heilongjiang 0.03 0.06 0.05 98 -15 0.01 0.01 0.02 • 0 197 
Nei Monggol 0.85 0.89 0.87 5 -3 0.02 0.03 0.04 17 59 
Jilin 0.05 0.04 0.04 -13 -2 0.02 0.02 0.02 18 -33 
Subtotal 0.94 1.00 0.96 7 -4 0.05 0.06 0.08 15 35 
Southern Collective Forest Region 
Fujian 0.34 0.57 0.79 65 40 0.04 0.20 0.44 460 115 
Jiangxi 0.98 I.IO 1.13 12 3 0 0.04 0.05 — 40 
Hunan 2.42 2.42 2.27 0 -6 0.90 0.83 1.79 -7 116 
Guangdong" 0.75 0.84 1.32 II 57 0.20 0.19 0.50 -5 163 
j Guangxi 0.71 0.80 0.99 13 23 0.05 0.06 0.20 30 223 
! Subtotal 5.20 5.73 6.50 10 13 0.37 0.57 1.36 54 138 
jSouthwest Mixed-Management Region 
Yunnan 0.32 0.59 0.68 84 15 0.05 0.09 0.14 62 61 
Sichuan 0.24 0.69 0.84 191 21 0.02 0.25 0.31 1,188 25 
-Subtotal 0.56 1.28 1.52 130 18 0.07 0.34 0.45 361 34 
North Central Fast-Growth Region 
Jiangsu 0.11 0.15 0.16 27 11 0.05 0.08 0.08 70 6 
Anhui 0.14 0.32 0.41 125 28 0.03 0.07 0.12 133 89 
Shandong 0.33 0.87 0.99 160 14 0.17 0.73 0.86 341 18 
Henan 0.31 0.33 0.43 6 31 0.10 0.10 0.17 -3 77 
Subtotal 0.90 1.99 84 20 0.35 98 123 185 28 
All China 11.28 13.74 16.10 22 17 1.50 3.41 5.30 127 55 
Notes: The years 1980, 1988, and 1993 are approximate for the three forest surveys. 
"Hainan is included v^ith Guangdong. 
Sources: National Forest Resource Statistics 1983, 1989, 1994. 
Table 6-6. Timber Resources and Production, Late i910s to Early i990s 
Timber forest volume Roundwood production 
Million m^ % Change Million m^ % Change 
Region 1980 1988 1993 1930-1988 / 988-/99T -^980 1988 1993" 1980-1988 I988^W3 
Northeast State Forest Region 
Heilongjiang 1.341 1,216 1,267 -9.3 4.1 16 19 12 15.6 -34.9 
Nei Monggol 797 775 798 -2.8 2.9 0.4 6 5 43.4 -14.8 
Jilin 571 590 619 3.2 5.0 6 6 5 0.9 -15.8 
Subtotal 2,709 2,581 2,684 -4.7 4.0 0.27 31 0.2 16.5 -27.2 
Southern Collective Forest Region 
Fujian 284 245 286 -13.7 16.9 4 6 6 45.4 0,5 
Jiangxi 229 157 167 -31.5 6.4 3 2 3 -21.5 II.O 
Hunan 158 123 135 -21.7 9.6 2 3 3 22.3 12 7 
Guangdong" 194 162 187 -16.4 14.9 3 2 3 -30.8 38 1 
Guangxi 174 156 154 -10.6 -1.4 2 2 3 30.7 37.6 
Subtotal 1.039 843 929 -18.8 10.1 14 15 0.18 78 • 57 
Southwest Mixed-Management Region 
Yunnan 976 698 662 -28.5 -5.2 2 3 A 350 99 
Sichuan 767 713 737 -7.0 3.3 4 5 5 84 « 6 
Subtotal 1.743 1.411 1.399 -19.0 -0.9 6 8 9 183 5.1 
North Central Fast-Growth Region 
Jiangsu 2 4 5 84.8 15.3 0 0.1 0.5 — 939 
Anhui 54 52 58 -3.6 10.0 0.5 0.4 2 -10 491 
Shandong 2 6 7 238.6 35.4 0 0.1 1 119 1.772 
Henan 19 24 30 27.5 24.4 0.2 0.2 2 3 1.031 
Subtotal 77 86 100 11.7 15.9 0.7 0.8 . 6 8 790 
All China 6,881.86 6,173.17 6.743.39 -10.3 9.2 54 62 64 16 3 
Notes: The years 1980, 1988, and 1993 are approximate for the three forest survey periods. 
"Hainan is included with Guangdong. 
''For the North Central provinces, this estimate is based on mean timber production after they attained the new higher level of output in the period 1990—1992. For the others, 
it is based on the mean output over the entire period 1988-1993. 
Sources: National Forest Resource Statistia 1983, 1989, 1994; China Agricultural Yearbook 1981, 1989, 1994. 
Masanobu Yamane 
Table 3 Forest resources expansion 1973-1998. 
Year Area of Volume of Area of land Volume of Forest cover 
forestland standing with forests forests (%) 
(million ha) stock 
(million m  ̂
(million ha) (million m  ̂
1973-1976 257.60 9^30 121.86 8,660 1Z7 
1977-1981 267.13 10^60 115.28 9,030 12.0 
1984-1988 267.43 10^70 124.65 9,140 13.0 
1989-1993 26189 11,790 133.70 10,140 13.9 
1994-1998 263.29 12,488 158.94 11,267 16.6 
Somce: China National Forest Resource Statistics (1973-1998). 
•̂9 
Notes: 1. Three northeastern provinces; 2. Yurman and Sichuan; 3. Ten southern provinces. 
Source: Developed by Yamane firom China National Forest Resource Statistics. 
Fig. 2 Forest distribution in China in 1997. 
Provinces for 
NFPP 
Source: Developed by Yamane from China National Forest Resource Statistics. 
Fig. 3 Total log production from 1985 to 1998 in China and provinces or autonomies 
for the Natural Forest Protection Project (NFPP). 
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China's Forsst Products Import 
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China's imports of timber, pulp, and paper 
products have increased in volume from about 40 
miUion cubic meters (roundwood equivalent, or 
RWE) in 1997 to nearly 107 million cubic meters 
RWE in 2003. The value of those imported forest 
products rose from US$6.4 billion in 1997 to 
$12.9 billion in 2003. 
Source: China's Forest Products Import Trends: 
1997-2002, Forest trends, 2004 
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